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recruitment/retention in collegiate aviation programs. He is also well published in areas related to effective teaching and has pioneered new 
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Igor Kabashkin
Dr. Igor Kabashkin is Vice Rector of the Transport and Telecommunications Institute, Latvia, and a Professor in the Aviation Maintenance 
Department and member of the Technical Committee on Transport of the European Commission for Cooperation in the Field of Scientific 
and Technical Research. Kabashkin received his Doctor Degree in Aviation from Moscow Civil Engineering Institute, a High Doctor 
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applications, reliability of technical systems, radio and telecommunication systems, and information and quality control systems. Dr. 
Kabashkin has published over 274 scientific papers, 19 scientific and teaching books, and holds 67 patents and certificates of invention.
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THE NEW U.S.JAPAN BILATERAL
AVIATION AGREEMENT: AIRLINE
COMPETITION THROUGH THE
POLITICAL PROCESS
Robert Matthews
FAA, Washington, D.C.
ABSTRACT
International aviation is still dominated by the remnants of a 1950s regulatory regime. A mosaic of
bilateral treaties continues to control supply, price, and market share as well as other aspects of
aviation. The U.S.-Japan airline market was previously defined by the U.S.-Japan Bilateral
Agreement of 1952, as amended. This paper offers a glimpse in how the aviation industry
participates in the political process to advance its own interests. The result of years of debate and
political maneuvering resulted in a new bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan with all
sides gaining some improvement over the prior 1952 agreement.
INTRODUCTION
In the midst of rapid change in the airline industry, recent negotiations
between Japan and the U.S. on a new bilateral aviation agreement remind us of
some basic principles of corporate political behavior in a regulatory world. The
most prominent lessons from these negotiations include the following.
1. Each regulatory issue affects different firms differently. As a result, each
firm participates in the political process to advance its own corporate
interests. Such behavior is legitimate, but it means that corporate political
behavior is seldom guided by broad values, such as the sanctity of
competition or free markets, and that notions of a singular industry
position seldom apply.
2. Firms must connect their interests to broad public interests or well
established policies. The result is a rash of common references to the
benefits of competition, lower prices, economic development, etc.
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3. Regulatory politics involve firms with similar interests who coalesce to
contend with opposing coalitions. Each actor competes for the economic
value that regulatory outcomes create, such as structuring U.S.Japan air
commerce to fit its circumstances.
Background: Bilateral Agreements
International aviation is undergoing such rapid structural change that
observers have difficulty keeping pace. Japan has recently deregulated its
domestic market and entire regional markets have been deregulated by the
European Union and South Americas Mercosur countries. New carriers are
popping up everywhere. At the same time, open-skies agreements between
countries are becoming commonplace and trans-border alliances between
carriers, which were almost unknown a few years ago, have divided much of the
worlds traffic among just a handful of large airline groupings. Now U.S.
carriers have taken the next step with same-country alliances among the worlds
six largest air carriers.
Yet, as this vibrant change unfolds and aviation rushes into a brave new
world, international aviation is still dominated by the remnants of a 1950s
regulatory regime. In international aviation, a mosaic of bilateral treaties
continues to control supply, price, market share, etc.
Before the recent agreement, the U.S.Japan airline market was defined by
the U.S.Japan Bilateral Agreement of 1952, as amended. The 1952 Agreement
entrenched Northwest, Pan Am and Japan Air Lines (JAL) as incumbents for so-
called Third- and Fourth-Freedom Rights.1 Third and Fourth Freedoms
essentially authorize a carrier to operate round trip flights between the carriers
home country and another country. Fifth-Freedoms (beyond rights) authorize a
carrier to operate a flight between the two countries, then continue the flight to
another destination.
United Airlines replaced Pan Am as an incumbent when United bought Pan
Ams Pacific routes. FedEx became an incumbent cargo operator in the same
way. Other carriers secured limited rights over the years. These carriers are
identified synonymously as nonincumbents or MOU carriers, as their rights
were not rooted in the original agreement, but were granted under subsequent
Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). MOU carriers included American;
Continental, its subsidiary, Continental Micronesia; Delta; UPS; All Nippon
Airways (ANA); and Japan Air Systems (JAS).
Given the political environment after World War II and the existence of only
one Japanese carrier at the time, U.S. carriers got the better of the 1952
agreement. Even today, U.S. carriers control a third of all slots at congested
Tokyo Narita and account for just over half of all international operations there.
The remaining international service at Narita is divided among carriers from
Japan and all other countries. Similarly, U.S. carriers received more Fifth
Freedom rights than did Japanese carriers under the 1952 Agreement. U.S.
carriers operated to eight destinations beyond Japan. Japanese carriers operated
2 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
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just one beyond flight twice a weekJAL to Brazil through Los Angeles.
New beyond rights or the extension of expiring beyond rights for United and
Northwest were a central issue in the negotiations. This was especially true of
Northwest, as Japan had denied separate requests for beyond service from
Seattle through Osaka and onto Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta. Northwest and the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) argued that these rights were
guaranteed under the 1952 bilateral, as Northwest was an incumbent. However,
Japan argued that these particular beyond points were not incumbent and
therefore constituted new authority. Beyond rights also proved critical to FedEx.
Early Terms of The Debate
The initial debate placed Japans preference for equalization against the U.S.
preference for open skies.2 The U.S. term of open skies might imply
straightforward competitionlet the best airline win. In fact, the term has
always meant less than that, though it indeed means major liberalization. The
U.S. uses the term to mean unlimited Third and Fourth Freedoms and, often, the
expansion of Fifth Freedoms. However, moving freely within someone elses
domestic market is decidedly not part of open skies for the U.S., despite the
connotation of wide open competition. Japan generously noted this point in the
negotiations, as a brief item in the Aviation Daily illustrated in June 1996:
Rejecting open skies, Japan says U.S. policy would open the international market
without any safeguards while keeping [the] U.S. domestic market for U.S. airlines
exclusively. This policy is pregnantwith the risk of further concentration in the
international market by mega-carriers.3
The sheer size of the U.S. airline industry is often lost on Americans. For
example, measured by flights operated, the U.S. is home to the worlds eight
largest airlines, including FedEx. Measured by jets operated, the U.S. is home to
the worlds seven top carriers; British Airways nudges into eighth place, just
three jets ahead of Southwest (265 jets versus 262 as of May 1998). The
domestic market alone in the U.S. still accounts for a third of world airline
demand. Simply put, U.S. allusions to the virtues of competition stuck in the
throats of Japans aviation officials when they were excluded from a third of the
world market.
However, opening up the internal U.S. market just was not part of the
conversation for DOT or for U.S. carriers, whether the carriers operate
internationally or only domestically. The same, of course, is true in other regions
of the world that have substantial domestic markets, including Japan and the
now single European Union. Nevertheless, this irritant was real, given the size
of the U.S. market.
The Genuine Appeal of Open Skies. Despite its qualified meaning, open
skies has real intellectual appeal. It is a major liberalization of international avia-
tion. DOT has persistently pursued open skies as its core policy in aviation since
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the Bush Administration signed the first open skies agreement with the Nether-
lands. The Clinton Administration has also successfully pursued open skies in
all its aviation negotiations. While inheriting open skies with the Netherlands
and a trans-border agreement with Canada, the Clinton Administration has
since driven new open-skies agreements in Central America, the Caribbean,
Western Europe, Asia, and most of South America.
DOTs interest in open skies is related to, but goes beyond, the normative
value of markets versus command-and-control regulation. Deregulation and
liberalization have become the primary direction of economic policy around the
world in most industries, including major domestic and regional aviation
markets. Whatever its historical justifications, extensive economic regulation of
international airline service no longer has a meaningful point in DOTs view.
Open skies now is a goal in its own right.
Japans View. In contrast to DOTs reference to principles of competition
and ending an outdated regulatory regime, Japan strongly resisted what it char-
acterized as U.S.-style open skies. By qualifying the term with U.S.-style,
Japan noted its exclusion from the huge airline market in the U.S. interior. Japan
saw open skies" as offering nothing meaningful in exchange for more access to
Japan and unlimited beyond rights into other parts of Asia.
Instead, Japan spoke of equalization. Japan bristled at having just one
beyond-flight through the U.S. and sought to equalize beyond rights and its
market share between the two countries. Real issues of national pride were
involvedJapan wanted to move beyond what it saw as an aviation treaty that
reflected Japans status as a conquered nation in 1952. Equalization meant equal
status as a sovereign nation.
However, equalization also involved a few issues other than national pride.
First, Japan was coping with the volatility of domestic deregulation. For 50
years, Japan had just three air carriers: JAL; ANA; and JAS. Deregulation in
Japans domestic market could add six or more new carriers within a year. As the
U.S. learned after 1978 and as Europe is learning today, a newly deregulated
industry can be volatile and is not without losers.
Japan had little interest in adding to the volatility of deregulation by
introducing open competition with U.S. carriers on international routes. Simply
put, U.S. carriers beat Japanese carriers badly on cost and productivity. On
average, unit costs for Japanese carriers exceed those of U.S. carriers by two-
thirds or more. JAS is especially hard pressed to reduce its costs, which have
long been more than double world averages. Such enormous cost differentials
made competition with U.S. carriers a tough issue for Japan.
Japan also had advantages to protect in beyond rights. If Japan were to secure
a major increase in beyond-U.S. rights, Japan would have to reciprocate.
However, Japanese carriers, especially JAL, were far better established
elsewhere in Asia than were U.S. carriers. Japans airlines carried substantial
traffic from other Asian cities to Tokyo or Osaka, then to the U.S. on other
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flights. Under the bilateral, such traffic originated in Japan, since these were not
through flights. Therefore, Japan already enjoyed extensive de facto beyond
rights. Japan had little to gain by conceding more beyond rights to U.S. carriers.
Finally, Japan argued that the U.S. simply ignored self-evident physical
constraints at Tokyos congested Narita, where no new slots would be available
for anyone until a new runway was built. Consequently, Japan held that open
skies simply was impossible. In addition, airlines from all over the world had
applied for new or expanded access to Narita. Japan argued that U.S. carriers,
who already controlled over half the international slots at Narita, could not
expect special treatment in order to jump the queue.
DOT countered the runway argument with three points. First, Japan had
talked about a new runway at Narita for several years. The time had come to get
on with it. Second, DOT noted that many disputes involved rights to and beyond
Osaka, not Narita. Therefore, the issue was about more than Narita, with or
without a new runway at Narita. Third, DOT said much of the congestion at
Narita was self-imposed by the absence of high-speed taxiways that are
commonplace at other single-runway airports, such as London Gatwick, San
Diego, etc., where aircraft exit quickly after touchdown. Japans conservative
ATC requirement on aircraft spacing restricts capacity even further. As a result,
Naritas single runway handles a maximum of about 25 operations an hour; a
comparable runway in the U.S. or Britain would handle twice that.
Japans Counter Offer. Instead of open skies, Japan sought dynamic liber-
alization, or controlled expansion, in which Third- and Fourth-Freedoms
would increase, but would remain regulated. The question for U.S. carriers and
DOT was how many new flights Japan would accept. DOT implied that an
increase of 150 to 200 weekly flights could becould beacceptable. Japan
did not commit itself publicly to a number, but dismissed DOTs numbers as pre-
posterous. Speculation commonly identified 90 new slots as the absolute maxi-
mum, or an increase of 36 percent.
Japan began outlining to negotiators in the summer of 1996 just what
controlled expansion and equalization would mean. Japan allowed that it would
accept an unlimited number of U.S.Japan points for two carriers from each
country (presumably Northwest, United, JAL and ANA), with an orderly
expansion of beyond-rights for U.S. incumbents, plus some new beyond
authority for non-incumbent U.S. carriers. In addition, nonincumbents would be
offered a substantial increase in frequencies and two new nonincumbents could
be designated. In exchange, Japan would expect ANA to be designated an
incumbent, and beyond rights and unlimited points would have to be equalized
for Japans two incumbents.
Though DOT continued to claim that open skies remained its goal, the debate
shifted to whether controlled expansion would offer enough new slots to keep
U.S. carriers happy, or whether it was only a negotiating ploy by Japan to delay
open skies indefinitely. U.S. negotiators and many U.S. carriers added that, if
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Narita really precluded new slots, controlled expansion would not be worth the
trouble. Based largely on this reasoning, Northwest and its allies continued to
insist on open skies, lest the U.S. trade away real growth in exchange for a phony
deal.
Yet, expansion, controlled or not, could advance the interests of many U.S.
carriers. Clearly, Japan was not interested in open skies. As a practical matter,
DOTs challenge was to move Japan as close as possible to open skies while still
accepting some regulatory limits. Though the question of how many remained
for U.S. carriers and DOT, Japans offer of expansion split the U.S. industrys
insistence on open skies.
Positions Taken by U.S. Carriers And Others
Incumbent U.S. Carriers. From the start, U.S. carriers had different
interests in the negotiations. United and Northwest, as incumbents, had
dominated the U.S.Japan market and were well established in Japan, with
hangars, gates, sales operations, and regional maintenance facilities. As of
summer 1997, United operated 87 round trips per week to and from Japan, while
Northwest operated 154. Nonincumbent U.S. carriers shared 30 weekly round
trips, for a U.S. total of 271 round trip slots per week. Japanese carriers had a
total of 134, or just 31 percent of the total.4
At a minimum, United and Northwest sought to protect their positions and
their capital investments. United and Northwest first sought nothing short of
open skies. Northwest was especially vocal in its demand for open skies. On its
face, Northwests 154 weekly flights versus Uniteds 87 would indicate
Northwest had more at stake than United. In fact, this understated the relative
importance of Japan to Northwest.
First, Northwest was ready to expand its presence in the region and sought
beyond authority into East Asia through Japan. Beyond-authority would enable
Northwest to build on its base in Japan before other U.S. carriers could do so.
Consequently, beyond-authority was important to Northwest, who, like DOT,
contended that Japans rejection of Northwests requests violated authority
included in the existing bilateral from 1952.
A related and more general concern for Northwest was its perceived need to
protect its base of 154 flights and its dominant position in the Japan-U.S. market.
This base was more important to Northwest than it was to United, important
though it was to United. By any measure, United was at least a third larger than
Northwest. United also had a few more options via its wider range of alliances
with foreign carriers. Uniteds Star Alliance included Air Canada, Lufthansa,
SAS, Thai Airways, and Varig. At the same time, ANA had entered agreements
with several Star Alliance partners, and was talking to United about a possible
agreement (which it later completed). Meanwhile, JAL and American were
talking about expanding a limited frequent flyer agreement into a broader
alliance, including codesharing, common services, etc.
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In contrast, if Japan could convince United that the increase in total slots
under controlled expansion would be adequate not only to protect its base but to
build on it, United likely would be happy to accept something short of open
skies, as would the three nonincumbent U.S. carriers. However, Northwest
could not easily afford to be so flexible. Depending on the details, controlled
expansion might not provide enough net growth to assure Northwest that it
could expand to or through Japan, or that it could protect its position against
United, or against alliances like JALAmerican or ANAUnited, or against the
sum of new frequencies operated directly by JAL, ANA, the existing U.S. MOU
carriers and any newly designated MOU carriers. Consequently, Northwest
continued pressing for open skies.
United, in fact, was satisfied that expansion and a deal with ANA would suit
it well enough. United suddenly softened its position and thereafter portrayed
Japans offer as something that was valuable and within reach. United added that
the proposed increase would offer satisfactory growth for all. Meanwhile,
Northwest continued to play hardball.
Nonincumbent U.S. Carriers. Nonincumbent U.S. carriers (American,
Continental and Delta) recognized that controlled expansion would enable them
in practice to expand as much as open skies would, given the relatively weak
base from which each would need to build. Consequently, those carriers lobbied
hard for DOT to accept what they characterized as meaningful change in the
right direction. In short, forget open skies and take a useful deal.
TWA put everyone on notice that it would apply for U.S.Japan authority
when negotiations were completed, whether they led to open skies or expansion.
TWA still preferred open skies as a matter of principle, but access was access.
U.S. Airways and Hawaiian Airlines later added their names to the list of
carriers who likely would apply for new authority.
However, other carriers also had interests consistent with those of Northwest.
Alaska Airlines, for example, had entered several codesharing and frequent
flyer agreements with Northwest. Though Alaska was unlikely to seek authority
to operate to Japan, it supported its new ally, Northwest.
America West also supported open skies. Though the carrier no longer
operated to Japan, it had done so in the past and might want to do so again.
However, expansion likely would mean benefits for incumbents and MOU
carriers. Even with one or two new U.S. MOU carriers, America West was
unlikely to be one of those new designees. Therefore, controlled expansion
might permanently exclude America West from the U.S.Japan market.
America West sought open skies to keep its options open.
More significantly, FedEx had a strong interest in the issue of beyond rights.
FedEx had been involved in bitter negotiations with Japan since at least 1993
over Fifth-Freedom services through Japan. FedExs plans called for the use of
747s on the trunk lines to North America, with a fleet of smaller aircraft, such as
737s, to provide collector and distribution operations throughout East Asia.
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FedEx and DOT both argued publicly that FedEx was entitled to these approvals
under the 1952 bilateral. Japan, however, saw it differently and said flatly that
this de facto cargo hub was outside the incumbent Fifth-Freedoms under the
1952 bilateral.
FedEx could get approval only for new Third- and Fourth-Freedom flights or
straightforward Fifth-Freedom rights, neither of which fit the carriers plans. In
fact, FedEx had not used many of its allotted Third- and Fourth-Freedom slots
under the bilateral agreement, because they did not advance FedExs long-term
strategic objectives. These unused slots later would become the source of a
bilateral compromise.
Yet, FedEx was not especially concerned about open skies, though open skies
would yield what FedEx sought. Instead, FedExs primary concern centered on
its Fifth-Freedom requests, with or without open skies.
The air carrier lineup eventually put incumbent United on the same side of the
issue as American, as well as Continental and Delta. Hawaiian, U.S. Airways
and TWA also came down on that side of the issue, as controlled expansion
likely would accommodate any realistic plans they might have. On the other
side, Northwest held firm in its demand for open skies and more beyond rights,
with support from Alaska and America West, and an angry FedEx in the corner.
Domestic Politics in The U.S.: Non-airline Stakeholders
Open skies advocates enjoyed the early advantage of being on the side of a
well-established government policy that was consistent with basic American
assumptions about the virtues of markets. The appeal of the open skies label was
reflected in early and vocal support from Capital Hill, especially from the
Senate. Up to 20 Senators went on record, either in letters to the White House or
in public statements, to urge the Administration to hold firm on open skies.
Many of those Senators took the extra step of warning the Administration
several times against settling for anything short of that objective.
Those Senators included Chairmen of seven committees, the Minority
Leader, and several members of the Appropriations Committee, plus Jesse
Helms, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This was no
small base from which to build support for open skies. Senator Helms, in fact,
went to the wire, with strong statements and threatening last-minute hearings on
the issue.
Besides benefitting from the connotations of open skies, Northwest
successfully linked its position to larger trade issues, arguing that open skies
with Japan was a test case demonstrating U.S. resolve in all trade issues with
Japan. Northwest got vocal support on this tact from Chrysler, General Motors
and the Automobile Manufacturers Association. Northwest lobbied Congress
hard with this argument and undertook an aggressive advertising campaign in
the Washington Post, with full-page adds that were complete with Japan
bashing, bureaucrat bashing, and references to Asias financial crisis. The ads
regularly included a half-page comic strip that portrayed President Clinton
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aboard a JAL jet being duped by his own staff into giving away the U.S. market.
Northwests ads used large, bold print to emphasize selected points. The ads and
their cartoons told readers the following.
Anything less than open skies is a surrender to Japans bureaucracy.
For decades, Japan has protected its industries from foreign
competition in Japan while orchestrating their expansion into the
U.S. Other Asian countries followed the Japan Inc. model. It hurt
us, but it worked for them, until now! (Original in bold.)
The Asian economic crisis is a direct result of these protectionist
policies. The remedy is the U.S. modelopen markets and free
competition. Unfortunately, Japans bureaucrats still havent
gotten the message. Japan is still insisting on an aviation deal that
follows the old Japan Inc. model. It will allow them to control
ticket prices, keeping them high, and restrict U.S. landing slots to
Tokyo, protecting their inefficient airlines, all the while doubling
Japans access to the lucrative U.S. market. Thats why U.S.
negotiators must insist on our policy of deregulation in international
aviation.
On the other side, advocates for controlled expansion included more than a
few cities and airport authorities who, for their own reasons, agreed that
expansion was valuable and within reach. Those airport authorities included
Chicago OHare (United and American hubs), Dallas/Fort Worth (an American
hub), Honolulu (to ensure continued arrival of Japanese tourists on U.S. or
Japanese carriers), Los Angeles (a likely destination for new JAL and ANA
flights), San Francisco (Uniteds Pacific hub) and others. Congressional support
for expansion included three Senate chairmen, most of the Illinois delegation
from both parties, the Governors of California, Hawaii and Illinois, and the
cities of Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco. In addition,
organizations known as the Midwest Coalition and Access U.S.Japan (each of
whom represented a group of airlines, including American and Delta, airport
authorities, and state and local governments) added their weight and ran their
own advertising campaign.
The U.S. side essentially moved to two coalitions of carriers and related
interests. Each side claimed the high road and accused the other of pursuing
narrow self interests.
Besides its hard ball advertising and congressional lobbying, Northwest
formally opposed every interim petition that JAL and ANA submitted to DOT.
FedEx did much the same and with rhetoric that became increasingly harsh and
targeted.
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The message from FedEx and Northwest was consistent: the petitions by JAL
and ANA usually were within the existing bilateral, but until Japan was willing
to extend beyond rights to Northwest that it (and DOT) believed were within the
same existing bilateral, DOT should no longer try to cooperate with Japan.
Aviation Daily provided a good example of this tactic when it summarized
Northwests filing to DOT in opposition to an application by JAL to increase its
flights from three weekly to seven weekly between Tokyo and Kona, Hawaii.
JAL contended that the existing bilateral authorized that expansion. Northwest
did not disagree with this contention, but added:
Northwest does not dispute that JALs requests are consistent with the U.S.Japan
Air Transport agreement, but Japans refusal to allow Northwest despite bilateral
entitlementto operate Seattle-Osaka-Jakarta service, including Fifth-Freedom
Osaka-Jakarta traffic, should prompt DOT to deny JALs bid Japans actions
seriously injured Northwest by limiting its ability to serve Asia and precluding
altogether Northwests participation in the U.S.-Indonesia market.5
FedEx and JAL then exchanged public insults when FedEx opposed a routine
JAL filing to DOT to renew JALs Third and Fourth Freedoms to operate cargo
service from Tokyo to Atlanta. FedEx, like Northwest, insisted that it was being
denied the use of existing authority for beyond service through Tokyo, so DOT
should not provide any unnecessary concessions. JAL retorted flatly that the
authority sought by FedEx was not part of the existing authority, and that Third
and Fourth Freedoms should not be held hostage to a dispute over the
interpretation of Fifth Freedoms.
FedEx publicly described JALs comments as astonishingly inappropriate,
misleading and arrogant. FedEx maintained that the bilateral permitted new
beyond service from Tokyoa position publicly taken by DOT in its approval
of Northwests beyond-rights complaint. JAL said it did not, and third/fourth
freedoms should not be held hostage to Fifth-Freedom battles. JAL added that
Moreover, the latest filing [by FedEx to DOT] is  almost unalloyed invective
of the sort that has no place in an administrative proceeding, [and is] full of
offensive representations. FedEx shot back that there was no polite phrase for
the deliberate and prolonged breach of a clear and valid bilateral commitment.
Patience was wearing thin on both sides.6
Other U.S. carriers were more conciliatory. United supported JALs Kona
application as long as [DOT] concludes that the government of Japan is prepared
to grant comparable approval to changes in U.S. carrier third/fourth freedom
schedules. United added that sanctions against Japan and its carriers would only
disrupt productive U.S.Japan negotiations on which Japan, according to
United, was showing signs of greater flexibility.7 A month later, United added
that It is not always reasonable to say no. We had better explore or study what
we can do. Delta took the conciliatory tone a step further on several occasions
to praise DOT for its persistence and skill.
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DOT then sharpened its own messages to Japan. In mid-February 1997,
DOT simultaneously approved for 180 days the JAL application at Kona, but
then issued an order in which DOT agreed with Northwests July 1996
complaint: by failing to approve Northwests request for beyond rights, Japan
had committed a most serious violation of the existing bilateral by blocking
Northwests beyond service to Jakarta. DOT chose not to impose sanctions just
yet, expressing hope that negotiations would settle the issue. However, the
message was clear: DOT had only so many options under U.S. law, and if delays
continued, DOT would be forced to take more aggressive action.
Within days of this order, DOTs Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Aviation Policy, Patrick Murphy, told the Institute for International
Economics that the U.S. is no longer prepared to sign a small deal satisfying the
short-term needs of a few U.S. and Japanese carriers whilerestricting future
U.S. rights. Additional short-term needs for Japanese carriers will just have to
remain unresolved until there is a breakthrough in our aviation relations. In
short, JAL could forget another extension, as could ANA unless they and their
government showed some movement.8
The European Union Enters the Equation. At this point in the negotia-
tions, the key issue was whether Japan could sell its alternative of controlled
competition by offering enough new slots at Narita and Osaka to appease U.S.
carriers and DOT. Doing so would, to say the least, be diplomatically awkward.
Japan had rejected applications for more Narita frequencies from carriers
around the world because Narita was said to be operating at capacity. If so, how
would the rest of the world react if Japan suddenly found slots for U.S. carriers?
The European Union (EU) made its position clear. If Japan offered new slots
to U.S. carriers and let them jump the queue, the EU said Japan would be
discriminating against European carriers, who were prominent in the queue into
Narita. Competition Minister, Karl Van Miert, and Transport Minister, Neil
Kinnock, reminded Japan that EU law authorized the European Commission
(the EUs executive branch) to take retaliatory action against Japans carriers,
who were busy increasing their access to Europe.
Summary of the Line Up. Northwest continued to play hard ball and had
managed to keep the congressional debate at least partly focused on broader
issues, such as free markets. In addition, Northwest had found allies in Detroit,
where U.S. auto manufacturers responded to general trade issues. However,
Northwest was beginning to find itself alone among U.S. passenger carriers,
with strong support only from Alaska Airlines, plus more distant support from
America West. Even the position of FedEx was a bit ambivalent toward open
skies; its focus was on beyond rights, under any label.
On the other side were the remaining large U.S. carriers for whom controlled
expansion would be just fine in practice. Though some of those carriers
preferred open skies in principle, controlled expansion likely would
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accommodate any growth that they could realistically manage in Japan. Those
carriers found allies in several major airport authorities, city and state
governments, congressional delegations and trade organizations, for who
controlled expansion would be adequate in practice.
DOT was somewhat caught in the middle. It had sought open skies as a
general principle for a decade anywhere the opportunity presented itself. DOT
saw little value in maintaining a regulatory structure that its career and political
leadership under both Republican and Democratic Administrations had long felt
was obsolete. Yet, DOT recognized that Japan would not accept full open skies.
Instead, DOT needed to get what it could get. The challenge was to continue
pushing as hard as possible for concessions but, at some point, not too hard.
Japans Ministry of Transport also was caught in the middle. It needed to
erase what it and its carriers had long perceived as second-class status under the
1952 bilateral. However, the Ministry could not seek the full equalization
implied by open skies because its carriers, already bracing for the volatility that
accompanies domestic deregulation, simply were not ready for it. In addition,
the Ministry had to offer something in return for its qualified equalization; the
U.S. would demand something substantial, even if it were short of open skies.
That something would require concessions on beyond rights for
incumbents, plus enough new slots to satisfy all three groups of U.S. carriers
with interests in the issue: incumbents; MOU carriers; and carriers seeking new
entry in the U.S.Japan market. However, the catch was that any new slots at
Narita would create diplomatic issues for Japan elsewhere.
Finally, Japan faced a major long-term strategic threat if it offered too little or
held out too long. U.S. carriers were entering codesharing agreements and the
U.S. government was entering open skies agreements rapidly in the region. If
Japan waited much longer, it might find it had forfeited its role as the hub
between North America and East Asia; some U.S. carriers already were
bypassing Narita en route to other destinations.
New Slots Are Found at Narita  Agreement
After nearly two years of debate and maneuvering, DOT proposed a
compromise: take the unused slots allocated to U.S. cargo operators and let DOT
or Japan allocate them to U.S. passenger carriers. FedEx, who agreed to let this
proposal stand, accounted for nearly 40 such slots alone, while UPS and ABX
added more slots. The difficulty, though, was threefold.
First, Japan would have to choose between the U.S. and the EU. Both the
Transport and Competition Commissioners of the EU noted that the long-
established practice required that any forfeited slots were to be placed in a truly
international pool and, in this case, reallocated by Japan to those carriers already
in line for new slots. The U.S. had no special claim to slots that its cargo carriers
were not using.
Second, U.S. carriers complained that, since the slots at issue were designed
for cargo carriers, they offered arrival and departure times that were simply
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brutal for passenger traffic. Too bad was Japans basic responseU.S.
carriers and DOT could sort that out among themselves. Third, with a total of 50
slots, the unused cargo slots at Narita would not do the job.
In the end, Japan chose to risk angering the EU; Japan took the offer and
actually improved its earlier offer:
An unlimited number of U.S.Japan points for two incumbent
carriers from each country, which meant ANA would become an
incumbent along with JAL, Northwest and United;
An orderly expansion of beyond rights for U.S. incumbents in
exchange for more beyond points for Japanese carriers;
New beyond authority for non-incumbent U.S. carriers;
A substantial increase in frequencies for nonincumbents;
The U.S. could designate two new MOU carriers immediately and
could add a third MOU carrier in two years;
Expansion would include some price flexibility to enhance
competition; and
U.S. MOU carriers would get a total of 150 new round trips a week,
in addition to unlimited expansion for incumbents.
Any number of factors could explain why Japan seemingly agreed rather
suddenly after two years of back-and-forth. First, DOT made clear that its
patience was running out a major advance would be required, and soon. More
importantly, the environment was beginning to bypass the negotiating chips
enjoyed by Japans Ministry of Transport. Japan had to defend its role as a
regional hub. In addition, U.S. and Japanese carriers were already negotiating
alliances that made carriers on each side of the Pacific, but especially in Japan,
reassess their position.
Finally, Northwest and Continental had announced a domestic alliance, in
which the fourth and fifth largest carriers in the world would coordinate routes,
ticketing, etc., complete with Northwest taking a 14-percent equity stake in
Continental. This predated the American-U.S. Airways and United-Delta
alliances, which emerged only after the negotiations. Northwest could live with
expansion, given the improvement in its own position and the new prospects
enjoyed by Continental, provided that Japan accepted this new same-country
codeshare without penalizing either carriers slots. Japan later did so.
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OK, Who Won?
Who won and who lost is not the most diplomatic question to ask, but the
honest answer is almost diplomatic: everyonewell, nearly everyone. Japan
won in that it held off open skies and unlimited competition between U.S. and
Japanese carriers. Japan also won by equalizing beyond rights and by adding an
incumbent carrier. In addition, Japan secured a codeshare with Northwest for the
weakest of its three established carriers (JAS). These were no small
achievements by the government on behalf of its national carriers; Japan
enhanced its position as an equal in a relationship between sovereigns.
The U.S. also won. DOT had brought home far more new slots than any
observers had thought possible throughout most of the negotiations. DOT also
had won unlimited Third and Fourth Freedoms for United and Northwest, while
adding substantial beyond rights for each. In addition, DOT added two new
incumbents immediately and a third after two years, with new slots and some
Fifth-Freedom rights for good measure.
Among the Japanese carriers, ANA clearly was a winner, with new
incumbent status, unlimited Third and Fourth Freedoms to and from the U.S.,
and assurances of new Fifth-Freedom rights. Meantime, ANA had added itself
to the Star Alliance.
United also was a winner. Besides securing an important alliance partner in
ANA, United also had won unlimited Third and Fourth Freedoms, and was
assured of new Fifth-Freedom rights. In the end, United could use its established
position in Japan to pursue any level of realistic growth that it might entertain. In
the meantime, by playing a rather moderate role during the negotiations, United
had avoided making enemies in Japan and may even have made a few friends.
Similarly, all three U.S. MOU carriers had clearly won. They were assured of
a significant number of new slots to accommodate any realistic growth. In
addition, American was about to close a deal with JAL, while Continental could
expand in its own right and piggyback on its new alliance with Northwest.
Similarly, Delta could expand in its own right and could piggyback on its yet-to-
be-announced alliance with United. In addition, like United, Deltas low-keyed
but conciliatory statements during negotiations had avoided making enemies in
Japan.
Other U.S. carriers also won, such as TWA and Hawaiian. They were
virtually assured of gaining new MOU status, especially after U.S. Airways
chose to stop pursuing MOU designation. Alaska, too, came out well. Its partner,
Northwest, already was dominant in the U.S.Japan market, and Northwest had
gained unlimited Third and Fourth Freedoms, plus expanded Fifth-Freedom
rights. Alaska could sell tickets throughout its market not only to Japan but to a
growing number of Fifth-Freedom destinations in Asia via Northwest.
Finally, even Northwest won. It had played hard ball but had helped push
Japan to make important concessions, such as unlimited Third and Fourth
Freedoms and expanded Fifth Freedoms. Northwest could build on its dominant
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position in the U.S.-Japan market. However, Northwest had three worrisome
outcomes. First, even if its insistence on open skies were only a negotiating
position, Northwest had come up short of its stated goal and thereby appeared to
have lost. Second, Northwest also had some fences to mend, both in Japan and in
the U.S. Even after negotiations were concluded, Northwests public statements
remained negative and aggressive. Given Northwests tactics and its shrill voice
during the negotiations, Japans Ministry of Transport and even DOT might
hesitate before doing Northwest any favors for some time.
Third, the agreement adds unlimited flights for four incumbents, including
ANA, plus expansion for three U.S. MOU carriers and three new U.S. MOU
carriers. The sum of these flights should at least double capacity. If demand
cannot support this supply, expansion may create enough new capacity to force
some future market shakeout. This is not what Northwest had in mind.
If so, the AmericanJAL and UnitedANA alliances could cut into
Northwests market share in a glutted market. However, the same risk faces
existing and new MOU carriers and Northwest starts from a strong position,
given its existing infrastructure in Japan. On balance, Northwest emerged in
good shape.
Finally, major airport authorities and their allies clearly won, with new flights
to and from Japan. Similarly, the Midwest Aviation Coalition and Access Japan
also won by establishing themselves as effective lobby groups in major trade
issues.
CONCLUSIONS
The core issues of expansion versus open skies, plus the issue of beyond
rights, affected different carriers differently. Modest expansion would have
accommodated growth plans for the three MOU carriers from the U.S., while
talk of adding ANA as an incumbent and adding three MOU carriers from the
U.S. satisfied another block of carriers. The incumbent U.S. carriers, especially
Northwest, had other interests to protect, and each acted accordingly.
Constituent airport authorities and local and state governments also lined up
according to their interests.
This produced two opposing coalitions on the JapanU.S. negotiations. Each
coalition was a temporary marriage of convenience among airlines, airport
authorities and governments whose interests were comparable or at least
compatible. However, because each issue can affect each organization
differently, members of each coalition are likely to oppose each other on
tomorrows issue. The guiding principle is not some high-level normative value,
such as the sanctity of open markets. Instead, like firms in other fields, airlines
compete in the politics of regulation to acquire the economic value and
competitive advantages that regulatory outcomes can create.
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ENDNOTES
1. Five Freedoms of the Air:
1. First freedom rights grant a foreign carrier the right of innocent passage to fly over
another country without landing.
2. Second freedom rights grant a foreign carrier the right to land in another country for
purposes of refueling and maintenance without offering commercial service to or from
that point.
3. Third freedomrights allowa foreign carrier to pick up traffic outside its homecountry to
be disembarked in its own country of registry.
4. Fourth freedom rights allow a foreign carrier to pick up originating traffic from its own
country for transport into another country.
5. Fifth freedom rights allow a carrier to pick up or disembark traffic enroute.
2. Open Skies agreement.
An agreement between two or more national governments that leads to freer trade in
aviation services through the elimination of entry barriers and/or the prohibition of
government regulation of routes and capacity.
3. Aviation Daily, June 27, 1996.
4. Aviation Daily, August 4, 1997.
5. Aviation Daily, January 8, 1998.
6. Aviation Daily, February 18, 1997: February 19, 1997; March 28, 1998.
7. Aviation Daily, January 9, 1997.
8. Aviation Daily, February 18, 1997.
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IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF
AIRLINE FREQUENT-FLIERS IN
AUSTRALIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
MARKET SEGMENTATION, TARGET
MARKETING, AND PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION
Rex S. Toh, Seattle University, Washington
Michael Y. Hu, Kent State University, Ohio
and
William G. Browne, Oregon State University, Oregon
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the frequent-flier membership profiles of airline travelers in Australia, their
demographic characteristics, behavioral discriminants, and attitudinal differences using standard
statistical techniques and stepwise canonical multiple discriminant analysis, and then advances the
implications for market segmentation, targeting, and product differentiation. It concludes by noting
that the samemethodology can be used formany service-oriented industries characterized by strong
customer loyalty engendered by repeat patronage reward programs.
INTRODUCTION
When American Airlines first launched its AAdvantage Frequent-Flier
Program in May 1981, patterning it after the Green Stamps idea, it soon became
the biggest and most successful marketing tool in the airline industry, replacing
toasters as the most sought after reward. Members of frequent-flier programs
earn points when they fly on the sponsoring airline and its affiliates, when they
rent cars or stay at hotels owned by its designated partners, or when they use
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airline-affiliated credit cards or other services. They can then cash in their
earned points mostly for free flights or upgrades. The airlines, on the other hand,
can cultivate new business, enjoy repeat patronage through progressively attrac-
tive awards given directly to the fliers, deter emerging airlines from entering
established markets, and compile the demographic profiles and travel character-
istics of their members through sign-up procedures and computerized flight log-
ins.
Today, both of the two largest airlines operating domestic routes in Australia
(Qantas/Australian and Ansett) have their own frequent-flier programs that are
growing very rapidly. In fact, a Qantas spokesperson was quoted as saying, The
program is growing like a wildfire not only do you have to manage the
program, but you have to manage the growth of the program itself.1 The modus
operandi of frequent-flier programs has been outlined (Toh & Hu 1988), their
impact on airline operations examined (Hu, Toh, & Strand 1988), the problem of
abuses documented (Toh, Fleenor, & Arnesen,1993; Arnesen, Fleenor, & Toh,
1997), their impact on corporations and the concomitant corporate responses
analyzed (Stephenson & Fox, 1987/1992), and the profiles of frequent-flier
program members described for the United States (Toh & Hu, 1990) and in
Australia (Browne, Toh, & Hu, 1995; Ford, 1993). This study uses standard sta-
tistical techniques and stepwise canonical multiple discriminant analysis to
identify characteristics of airline frequent-fliers in Australia, and then examines
the implications for market segmentation, target marketing, and product
differentiation.
SURVEY DESIGN
We conducted a survey of airline passengers at Sydney Airport over a period
of seven consecutive days, covering each day of the week at different times to
neutralize daily variations in passenger profiles. Also, on the recommendation
of the Airport Duty Manager, our field workers spent equal amounts of time at
the departing Qantas/Australian, Ansett, and international terminals to reflect
his best estimate of the traffic breakdown. Departing airline passengers were
asked to respond to a two-page form consisting of 24 questions. We were
fortunate in achieving an 85 percent response rate among those approached,
resulting in a total of 377 completed and usable questionnaires filled out by
Australian residents.
Frequent-flier Program Membership Profile
Altogether, 25 percent of the respondents identified themselves as members
of frequent-flier programs, representing 3.65 million out of the 14.6 million air
travelers in Australia who fly each year.2 Among the frequent-fliers, 75 percent
considered themselves as primarily business travelers, whereas only 25 percent
flew primarily for pleasure. As 48 percent of all travelers considered themselves
as primarily business travelers, this means that among them, 39 percent were
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members of frequent-flier programs. Conversely, as 52 percent of all air
travelers flew primarily for pleasure, this means that among them, only 12
percent were program members.3 For the moment, note that the proportion of
frequent-fliers are more than three times higher among business travelers than
among pleasure travelers.
Demographic Profile of Frequent-fliers
Demographic differences between members and nonmembers of frequent-
flier programs were significant. In total, 74 percent of all members were men,
whereas only 26 percent of all members were women, with the male/female
ratio of members at 2.85 compared with only 1.35 for nonmembers, suggesting
that men are vastly over-represented among frequent-fliers. In terms of income,
47 percent of the members earn more than A$60,000 a year, compared with only
17 percent for the nonmembers. The observation that a larger proportion of the
members are wealthy can in turn be partly explained by the fact that, whereas
74 percent of the members are above 30 years of age, only 59 percent of the non-
members belong to this mature group.
Finally, when nonmembers were asked for the primary reason they did not
belong to frequent-flier programs, 95 percent said they made too few trips. The
results of statistical tests suggest that nonmembers who claim they fly too infre-
quently to justify joining, do indeed fly less frequently (p = 0), usually travel for
pleasure (p = 0.002), and tend to be poorer (p = 0).
Behavioral Discriminants of Frequent-fliers
Discriminant analysis was used to distinguish between members and non-
members. The predictor variables that provided the greatest group separation
were regarded as significant descriptor variables associated with each market
segment. Throughout, stepwise canonical multiple discriminant analysis was
used with SAS default values of a = 0.15 to enter and stay in the discriminant
function, based on a training sample of n = 165. Note that a holdout sample of
n = 159 was reserved for validating the discriminant function, necessary because
the classification matrices are compiled on the analysis data used to compute the
discriminant function, creating an upward bias on the hit ratio of correct classifi-
cations of the criterion variable (Hair, Anderson, & Tatham, 1987).
Behavioral characteristics (decision criteria) were then measured by asking
respondents to rate, on a five-point scale (where 1 = very important and 5 = not at
all important), the following variables in choosing an airline:
X1 = Convenience of schedules
X2 = Cabin service
X3 = Meal quality
X4 = On-time departure and arrival
X5 = Frequent-flier programs
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X6 = Low or discount fares
X7 = Recommendations of a travel agent
X8 = Recommendations of a corporate travel planner
To correctly interpret the standardized canonical multiple discriminant
coefficients, note that for the two-group multiple discriminant function
members = 1 and nonmembers = 2.
Results from the stepwise canonical multiple discriminant analyses based on
the training sample with membership category as the criterion variable and the
eight behavioral characteristics as the predictor variables are shown in Table 1.
At the 15 percent level of significance, the following behavioral characteris-
tics were found to discriminate between members and nonmembers, in descend-
ing order of the partial coefficients of determination (partial R2): frequent-flier
programs (X5), meal quality (X3), agent recommendation (X7) and cabin service
(X2). These four significant predictor variables generated an average squared
canonical correlation of 30 percent within the multiple discriminant function,
which was very significant (Wilks Lambda = 0.70, p = 0.0001). Furthermore,
the hit ratio (measuring the proportion of members and nonmembers correctly
classified) was 75 percent, comparing favorably with the proportional chance
criterion (representing the prediction one would expect with pure chance) of 61
percent. More impressively, when the multiple discriminant function was
applied to the holdback sample, the hit ratio was 96 percent.
Given a critical cutting score of zero (since the canonical multiple discrimi-
nant function coefficients were all standardized), and a coding protocol where
members = 1 and nonmembers = 2, all negative standardized coefficients are
directly associated with membership (group centroid = -1.09) while all positive
standardized coefficients are associated with nonmembership (group centroid =
0.40). But since the scale is reversed (where 1 = very important and 5 = not at all
important), compared with nonmembers, members are more likely to consider
frequent-flier programs as more important, and regard meal quality, agent
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Table 1
Multiple Discriminant Analysis on Behavioral Characteristics: Membership Status
Step Variable Entered Stand. Disc. Coef. Partial R2 F-stat p-value
1 X5 (Frequent-flier program) 1.06 1.04 26.57 0.0001
2 X3 (Meal quality) -0.45 0.12 21.90 0.0001
3 X7 (Agent recommendation) -0.41 0.05 7.78 0.0059
4 X2 (Cabin service) -0.35 0.03 4.17 0.0429
Wilks Lambda = 0.70, p = 0.0001
Averaged squared canonical correlation = 0.30
Members group centroid = -1.09
Nonmembers group centroid = 0.40
Hit ratio = 123/165 = 75 percent
Proportional chance criterion = (0.27)2 + (0.73)2 = 61 percent
recommendation, and cabin service as less important in choosing an airline. The
reverse is concomitantly true for nonmembers.
Note that low or discount fares (X6) were left out of the multiple discriminant
function because of some multicollinearity (R2 = 0.23) with agent recommenda-
tion (X7). However, by itself, a two independent samples t-test showed that for
low or discount fares, the difference in the importance rating between the means
for members (2.44) and for nonmembers (1.74) is significant at p = 0.0024, sug-
gesting that compared with members, nonmembers place importance on low or
discount fares.
Furthermore, compared with nonmembers, members of frequent-flier
programs tend on average to travel twice as often (10 trips versus five trips per
year). A comparison of the frequency distributions for members and nonmem-
bers shows that whereas 70 percent of members travel alone, the corresponding
figure for nonmembers is 60 percent, again reflecting the fact that frequent-fliers
are usually business travelers on work related travel. This notion is supported by
the observation that 68 percent of the members were traveling on tickets paid for
by corporations or the government, versus only 42 percent for nonmembers.
Attitudinal Differences
Attitudinal characteristics were measured by asking respondents to rate, on a
five-point scale (where 1 = agree strongly and 5 = disagree strongly) five
different statements concerning frequent-flier programs. Results of two inde-
pendent samples t-tests on attitudinal differences by membership category are
shown in Table 2.
Results from Table 2 show that compared with nonmembers, members are
more likely to agree that frequent-flier programs influence the choice of an
airline, are less deterred by taxes, are more likely to believe in concentrating on
one program to get best results, and are less afraid that the frequent-flier program
will go bankrupt.
Furthermore, when respondents were asked how important frequent-flier
programs would be in choosing an airline if the bonuses were considered free
employee benefits versus if they were company property, a match paired t-test
indicated a very significant difference in attitude (p = 0.0001) under the separate
ownership scenarios. The difference in the ratings given by each respondent to
the importance of the programs under the two ownership scenarios was then
treated as a dependent variable in a multiple regression model. Treating
members and nonmembers as a dummy independent variable, the difference in
ratings was significantly larger for the members than for the nonmembers
(p = 0.70), indicating, not surprisingly, that compared with nonmembers,
members place greater importance on the individual ownership of travel
bonuses.
When the importance of frequent-flier benefits owned by a corporation was
treated as a dependent variable in a multiple regression framework, the partial
regression coefficients for taxes, convenience of schedules, and the quality of
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meals were all negative (p = 0.10, p = 0.70, p = 0.24, respectively), suggesting
the self-serving attitude that those who worry most about taxes, convenience of
schedules, and meal quality are the very ones who are least interested in accruing
benefits for their corporations.
Market Segmentation And Targeting
One of the most important objectives of market segmentation and target
marketing is to increase efficiency by focusing marketing effort toward the
target segment in a manner consistent with its associated characteristics (Boote,
1981). The twin ideas of market segmentation and target marketing require an
adjustment of marketing effort to cater to differences in consumer characteris-
tics and needs, resulting in a differentiation of product or service so that they are
perceived by the consumer to differ from the competition (Dickson & Ginter,
1987). This presupposes the possibility of actionability (Wind, 1978), which
in our study relates to an airlines ability to tailor its marketing mix to its target
markets characteristics. The marketing process is therefore threefold: (a) divide
the market into homogeneous and distinct segments, (b) select the target market
according to appropriate criteria, (c) design the appropriate marketing mix of the
right product, place, promotion, and price conforming to the target segments
demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics.
For purposes of market segmentation and targeting, we recognize two cate-
gories of air carriers in Australia. The following are categorized as large carriers
characterized by interconnected national route networks: Qantas/Australian
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Table 2
Attiduninal Differences Between Members and Nonmembers
(Average Agreement Ratings)
Nonmembers
Variances Based on Assumption
Attitude Members F-tests at a = 0.05 on Group p-value
XA = Membership in a mileage
program often influences my
choice of an airline. 1.95 2.47 Equal 0.0056
XB = If I had known my prizes
might be taxed, I wouldnt have
joined the program. 2.79 2.49 Equal 0.1134
XC = It is wisest to belong to
all the different programs to get
maximum flight flexibility. 3.00 3.00 Equal 1.0000
XD = Concentration on one
program yields the best results. 2.17 2.51 Equal 0.0500
XE = I am afraid that the
frequent-flier program I am
enrolled in will go bankrupt. 3.77 3.23 Unequal 0.0125
with approximately 44 percent of the domestic air travel market, Ansett with 36
percent, and Air New Zealand that after November 1993 could operate domestic
services in Australia under the terms of the Closer Economic Relationship
Agreement creating a Single Aviation Market. The small airlines consist of the
regional and commuter airlines that often feed into the trunk networks plus new
upstarts such as the now-defunct Compass.
The large airlines should target the frequent-flier segment of the market for
the following reasons. First, it is a substantial and growing market. As we have
shown, one-quarter (3.6 million) of all air travelers in Australia (14.6 million)
belong to at least one frequent-flier program with some (24 percent) belonging
to more than one to get maximum flight flexibility without sacrificing travel
bonus points. Second, since they have been shown to exhibit distinct or signifi-
cantly different demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics, they
can be reached and attracted through a carefully conceived promotional
campaign and appropriate product differentiation. Third, frequent-flier
members are an attractive market segment in that generally they are heavy users
of air travel services, fly all year round on business, and often fly on premium or
full fare tickets. Fourth, frequent-flier programs allow the sponsoring airlines to
compile and track the demographic profile and travel patterns of their members
through sign-up procedures and computerized log-ins, providing useful longitu-
dinal information over time.
The small airlines with limited network structures cannot have viable or
attractive frequent-flier programs, since we have shown that members show a
strong preference for concentrating on one bonus program rather than belonging
to all of them (see Table 2). The dismal experience of Compass Airlines is par-
ticularly instructive in this respect. Soon after airline deregulation in October
1990, Compass was launched in December of the same year. With a substantial
cost advantage over Australian and Ansett,4 it was able to offer economy fares
20 percent below the unrestricted fares of Australian and Ansett so that by
September 1991, Compass had captured more than 20 percent of the share of the
markets in which it competed.5
In the absence of U.S. style hub-and-spoke systems providing dominance in
scheduling and interconnections, the two domestic incumbents struck back in
the same manner in which the major airlines in the United States have attempted
to keep the new low-cost, no-frills, smaller airlines from entering the established
markets - launch or improve frequent-flier programs to retain customer loyalty.6
Partly because of this, Compass went bankrupt in December 1991, was resusci-
tated in August 1992, launched its own limited frequent-flier program, and went
bankrupt again soon after. It is clear that the only way the small airlines can
operate successful bonus programs is to link with the large airlines as participat-
ing affiliates, an arrangement that will be resisted by the large airlines on their
established routes. Therefore, it is probably incumbent upon the small airlines to
target the nonmember segment of the airline market and differentiate their
product accordingly.
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Product Differentiation
Once the target market has been identified, the marketing mix must be cus-
tomized to conform to the characteristics of the chosen segment so that the
product offering is perceived by the consumer to be different from and superior
to the competition. Frequent-fliers (the target segment of the large airlines) tend
to be older, higher income, business people who fly regularly all year round on
premium or full fares at corporate expense. Compared with nonmembers,
members place more importance on frequent-flier programs in choosing an
airline, and believe in concentrating on one (the importance rating is positively
and significantly correlated with the need to concentrate on one bonus program
with r = 0.17 and p = 0.06). It has also been shown that members will play the
frequent-flier game only if the travel bonuses accrue to them individually rather
than to the corporations paying for the tickets.
Given these demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal correlates, it is
important that the large airlines have the most attractive frequent-flier programs
to generate business and retain brand loyalty. The effectiveness of these
programs as a marketing tool in Australia is underscored by the fact that soon
after the merger of the Qantas and Australian frequent-flier programs, business
travelers preferred Australian to Ansett by 46 percent to 38 percent, reversing
the previous preference pattern.7 To overcome the disadvantage of size and lack
of an international route network, Ansett has affiliated itself with many interna-
tional carriers, including heavyweights such as United and Singapore Airlines.
It is also imperative that the large airlines in Australia continue not to allow cor-
porations to join their programs8 to prevent them from using the travel awards
for future business travel, because members have indicated that they consider
the individual ownership of the awards as very important.
In operating these frequent-flier programs, it should be noted that airlines in
Australia have almost solely targeted frequent business travelers who account
for more than 64 percent of all domestic travel9 by charging an initial fee instead
of following the example of airlines in the United States that enticed new
members with bonus points, and by severely restricting the shelf life of the
points and the travel awards. Furthermore, to reward repeat frequent-fliers who
make frequent short trips on popular short hauls such as MelbourneSydney,
Qantas/Australian has 10 bands or redemption zones (specifying the number of
earned points needed for free travel) while Ansett has four, whereas in the conti-
nental United States there is only one.
Note that in Australia, unlike in the United States, frequent-flier benefits are
taxable under Tax Ruling TR93/02 effective July 1, 1992. Under this ruling,
even if the travel awards are earned through privately funded trips, they are
taxable if transferred to other family members.10 Qantas/Australian has wisely
responded by creating the Personal Flight Rewards Division where frequent-
flier program members can choose to sign a document agreeing that their points
will be redeemed only for their exclusive use.
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While going for the premium or full-fare frequent-flier business market, it is
imperative that the large airlines in Australia do not suffer the same problems
that plague the airlines in the United States over promoting their frequent-flier
programs. The large airlines in Australia have wisely avoided the problem of
owing excessively large amounts of points or unused travel awards on their
balance sheets by declaring that points will expire unless redeemed within two
years, and by making travel awards good for only one year. Furthermore,
members can nominate only five family members within the Family Flight
Rewards Division redemption group so travel awards have limited transferabil-
ity, and certainly cannot be sold to coupon brokers, a practice that was rampant
in the United States. To further reduce yield dilution or displacement of
premium fares, the large airlines in Australia have wisely placed many time and
place restrictions on flight upgrades. They also do not allow free travel during
peak hour travel to avoid displacing paying passengers. In this regard, the large
airlines in Australia have done a much better job of yield management than their
American counterparts (Toh, Browne, & Hu, 1996).
In targeting the repeat premium or full-fare business travel market consisting
of high income frequent-fliers, the fare elasticities of demand can be expected to
be relatively low. Although to our knowledge no measurements have been made
on Australian routes, based on a sample of 200 intra-U.S. routes, Oum, Gillen, &
Nobel (1986) discovered that the fare elasticities of demand for first class
service is between 0.60 and 0.80. Significantly, they noted that the fare
inelastic demand conforms with the observation that a majority of the first class
passengers are business travelers flying on corporate accounts. Given these
empirical findings, it is likely that business travelers who travel at corporate
expense have inelastic demands for air travel. Working on Cascade Airways
data, Toh, Kelly, & Hu (1986) have shown that in all six flight sectors investi-
gated, the optimal fares were invariantly inversely related to the point elastici-
ties. Thus the large airlines going for the frequent business fliers should keep
fares relatively high.
When asked to rank the eight factors that affect airline service, frequent fliers
indicated that on-time performance and convenience of schedules were the most
important. Thus it is essential that the large airlines match their higher fares with
schedule convenience achieved by offering more flights on smaller aircraft as
was successfully implemented by Pacific Southwest Airlines (Toh & Higgins,
1985), and improve their on-time performance so essential to the business
traveler.
Finally, compared with nonmembers, frequent-flier program members (the
target market) are more concerned with collecting bonus points and maximizing
them by concentrating on one program. But members are less concerned with
cabin service, meal quality, and the recommendation of travel agents (see Table
1). Thus, the implication on promotional strategy is that the large airlines should
emphasize superior frequent-flier programs and the large number of flights they
offer for schedule flexibility, so that members can fly at convenient times on the
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same airline to quickly accumulate enough points for travel awards. In this
regard, note that, whereas members in the United States belong to an average of
4.0 programs, in Australia the figure is only 1.28, and only 24 percent of the
members are enrolled in multiple programs.
The small airlines in Australia should not try to compete with Qantas/
Australian and Ansett11 for the established frequent business travel market, as
the dismal experience of the twice bankrupt Compass Airlines demonstrates. As
long as the above-mentioned domestic incumbents are in healthy competition
with one another on the established routes, the government will not intervene, a
de facto continuation of the Two Airline Policy.12 But the Australian aviation
market is very concentrated with 80 percent of the airline passengers flying in
the top 20 markets (Grimm & Milloy, 1993) located mostly in the southeastern
corner of the continent where the established incumbents are entrenched. This
leaves the small airlines with three alternatives. They can target the other 20
percent of the market where the large airlines have not established a dominant
presence (for example providing nonstop service between Alice Springs and
Darwin), offer commuter services feeding into the larger airlines route
networks and affiliate with their frequent-flier programs as subsidiaries, or
compete with the established incumbents for the nonbusiness travel market
offering cheap no-frills airline service.
Should the small airlines target the infrequent fliers traveling mainly for
pleasure, and how should the product offering be differentiated? To be sure, the
small airlines cannot compete with the large airlines based on superior service.
Not only do the large airlines have greater flight frequency and bigger and better
frequent-flier programs, many frequent-fliers belong to Qantas/Australians
Flight Deck and Ansetts Golden Wing, paying up to A$200 for what have been
described as two of the best lounge clubs in the world. But deregulation since
October 1990 allows the small airlines to compete on the basis of fares.
In this regard, recall that non-frequent-fliers are generally younger and
poorer and usually fly for pleasure. They are more likely to choose an airline
based on price. To capture this segment of the market, the small airlines should
offer lower discounted fares to attract the economy minded pleasure travelers.
This is because Oum, Gillen, & Noble (1986) found that the fare elasticities of
demand for discounted tickets range from 1.50 to 2.00 while Straszheim
(1978) reported a figure of 2.74 for the discounted fares on the North Atlantic
route.
But these discounted fares must not be applied indiscriminately. To keep the
full fare and discount fare markets separate within the price discrimination
framework, fences in the form of travel restrictions should be imposed,
including capacity control with limited availability of discounted seats on
flights with high load factors, maximum and minimum stay requirements,
advance purchase of tickets with cancellation penalties, departure time restric-
tions, standby arrangements, and no-frills service, very much like what Shuttle
by United has done on the west coast of the United States. In fact, it has been
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claimed that one reason Compass went bankrupt the first time in December 1991
is that, among other things, this low-cost, no-frills carrier did not have a coherent
yield management strategy (Nyathi, Hooper, & Henser, 1993). Thus, through
the careful process of price discrimination and market separation, the fare-
sensitive and more flexible pleasure travelers will be enticed to fly on reduced
rates to fill otherwise empty seats, while businesspeople traveling on corporate
expense and requiring schedule flexibility and comfort remain captive to full-
fare ticketing. Those who are interested in a more thorough discussion of the
price discrimination model in the airline industry should see Toh (1979).
Finally, given our survey findings, compared with the large airlines, the small
airlines should spend proportionally more on sales promotion and less on adver-
tising. The sales promotion should be targeted primarily toward travel agents
upon whom non-frequent-fliers have been shown to rely. The promotional
messages should emphasize low fares.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Australia is a very large country with a small population of 18 million people
located mainly in concentrated pockets around the coastal fringes of the
continent. This makes air travel an essential means of transportation, with 35
percent of all passenger trips over 1,000 kilometers made by air.13 The market
for air travel can be segmented into frequent-fliers and non-frequent-fliers.
Given their demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics, we have
suggested that large airlines with frequent services on interconnected route
networks should target the frequent-flier business market with attractive travel
bonus programs to cultivate new business and engender brand loyalty. The large
airlines should differentiate their product by offering frequent and superior on-
time service and charge relatively high fares commensurate with low price elas-
ticities of demand associated with high income passengers and business
travelers flying at corporate expense, especially on the short haul Adelaide-
Melbourne-Canberra-Sydney-Brisbane business corridor.
On the other hand, the small airlines with limited route networks and small
frequent-flier programs ought to target the younger, lower income, non-frequent
fliers with discounted fares, coupled with heavy travel restrictions to attract the
price- sensitive pleasure travelers without substantial diversion from the
otherwise full-fare passengers. Also, because this target segment has been
shown to rely more on travel agents, the small airlines should spend proportion-
ally more of their promotional budget on sales promotion targeted specifically
toward ticket brokers.
In conclusion, we would like to point out that our methodology for customer
identification, market segmentation, target marketing, and product differentia-
tion can be used for many service oriented industries characterized by strong
customer loyalty engendered by repeat patronage reward programs. This would
include the airline industry that we have examined as well as the hotel and
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resorts sector. First, one may use discriminant analysis to separate, for example,
the characteristics of airline frequent-flier members or hotel frequent-stayer
members (see Toh, Hu, & Withiam, 1993) from the nonmembers, and then
identify their demographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics. Second,
one then needs to select a target market in which one has a comparative
advantage. Third, the product or service offering consisting of the marketing
mix must then be tailored toward the differential needs of the selected target
market.
ENDNOTES
1 See, Grimm & Milloy (1993). 266.
2 Licklin, L., (1994, January 11). Have points, wont travel. The Bulletin, 44.
3 The computations are as follows: (.75) (.25)/(.48) = .39 and (.25) (.25)/ (.52) = .12.
4 Total cost per available seat kilometer for Compass was found to be about 8 cents
compared to about 14 cents for the two domestic incumbents. See BTCE, (1991). Deregulation of
domestic aviation: The first year. Australian Government Publishing Service: Canberra.
5 See, Grimm & Milloy (1993). 266.
6 See, Thorpe, J. (1992, February). New times down under. Transport World. 97.
7 See, Ford. (1993).
8 Note that several major international airlines such as KLM, Air India, Japan Airlines,
and Lufthansa have started corporate frequent-flier programs.
9 See, Ryan, K. (1989, May). Deregulation in Australia: Time travel or timed travel. Aus-
tralian Aviation. 97.
10 For a discussion of the taxation of frequent-flier benefits, see Roberts, R. (1993, March).
The importanceof accounting standards in tax law.AustralianAccountant. 57; andLyons,M. (1993,
December 3). FTB: Frequent benefits tax. Business Review Weekly. 74.
11 To date, Air New Zealand is not a factor, although the Closer Economic Relationship
Agreement creating a Single Aviation Market gives it cabotage rights to operate domestic services
within Australia.
12 For a discussion of the Two Airline Policy see Forsyth, P. (1991). The regulation and
deregulation of Australias domestic airline industry in airline deregulation: The international
experiences. New York: University Press.
13 See, Ryan, K. (1989). op. cit.
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THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN
CIVIL AVIATION
Ruwantissa I. R. Abeyratne
Montreal, Canada
ABSTRACT
The African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) held its Fifteenth Plenary Session in Abuja,
Nigeria from20-24April 1998. Themeetingwas held at a critical period in the global history of civil
aviationwhen thewinds of change and liberalization in air transport were sweeping the air transport
industry, calling for fierce competition among carriers to set up viable airlines,whether singularly or
collectively. Africa is all too conscious of the rapidly evolving face of commercial aviation which
has recently brought on titanic profiles ofmerged carriers and crafty but legal commercial tools such
as outsourcing and franchising in the airline industry. The AFCACmeeting focused on the need to
implement its own regional plans expeditiously and to infuse new life to its aviation entities by
making them autonomous and competitive. There was also heavy emphasis on the need to focus on
safety and training of personnel.
So far, African civil aviation has been courageous amidst competition and energetic in its collectiv-
ity. However, it now needs a boost in the arm and a much needed blood transfusion to stand up to its
competition in other parts of the world and run with the portentous winds of change that are rapidly
blowing towards the next millennium. This paper discusses ways and means available to African
civil aviation to achieve this goal.
INTRODUCTION
Regulatory responsibility for civil aviation in Africa falls generally under the
broad umbrella of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)1 which
is charged with global regulatory responsibility in the field of civil aviation. At
the regional level, and through cooperation with ICAO, the African Civil
Aviation Commission (AFCAC)the regional specialized agency of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU)2 which is charged with the responsibility
for development of civil aviation in Africatakes responsibility in assisting
member African States in their endeavour towards developing civil aviation in
their territories. At its Fifteenth Plenary Session held in Abuja in April 1998,
AFCAC sought to face reality squarely in the eye, by addressing the key issues
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which may affect the African States in the next millennium in attaining success
as a competitive force in the world of civil aviation.
At the meeting, AFCAC addressed in limine the cornerstone of African civil
aviationthe Yamoussoukro Declarationwhich is the fundamental postulate
containing the strategies considered by the Africans as inherent in their aviation
philosophy. As its commitment towards the development of African civil
aviation, AFCAC resolved to play a more prominent role in the implementation
of the Declaration together with such other organizations as the African Airlines
Association (AFRAA).
This article will analyse the microcosm of the issues which AFCAC,
AFRAA and other concerned African civil aviation bodies would need to
address in order to attain their objectives and goals.
The History of Civil Aviation in Africa
One of the watershed events of African civil aviation history occurred in
1961 when 10 African nations3 signed the Treaty on Air Transport in Africa.4
Popularly known as the YaoundØ Treaty, it has its roots in Articles 77 and 79 of
the Chicago Convention of 19445 which provides for the setting up by two or
more States of joint or international operating organizations and for the partici-
pation of the States in these organizations. Based on these principles, the
YaoundØ Treaty established perhaps the oldest surviving jointly owned
airlineAir Afriqueto operate on behalf of its contracting States interna-
tional services between their territories and from their territories to non-
contracting States territories6 and also domestic air services within the territo-
ries of the contracting States.7 These services are now operated by the airline
consequent to the negotiations between contracting States carried out through a
body named Comite Multinational de Negociation des Etats Signataires du
TraitØ de Yaounde (CMN). At the present time, contracting States to the
YaoundØ Treaty include States of Western and Central African sub-regions.
The second major event in African civil aviation history occurred in 1988
when African civil aviation ministers gathered in Yamoussoukro in the Republic
of Côte dIvoire on 6 and 7 October and signed the Yamoussoukro Declaration
on a New African Air Transport Policy.8 This declaration was the result of a col-
lective consensus in Africa that African nations must, inter alia, prepare for the
effects of deregulation in the United States on other countries and the potential
adverse effects on African airlines of the air transport liberalization policies of
Western Europe, especially the application by EEC of the Treaty of Rome to air
transport services and the creation of a single internal European market by 1993.
The Declaration also responds to the fact that many aircraft owned by African
airlines are obsolete and thus in need of replacement at great cost, particularly
with regard to the need for African airlines to comply with Chapters 2 and 3 of
the Annex 16 to the Chicago Convention concerning aircraft noise. Another
compelling issue addressed at Yamoussoukro and incorporated into the Declara-
tion concerned the liberal exchange of air traffic rights by African States and the
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need for African airlines to market their product competitively through an
unbiased computer reservation system.
The Yamoussoukro Declaration committed African States, both individually
and collectively, to achieve the total integration of their airlines under the above
policies within a period of eight years. The eight years was divided into three
phases of two years, three years, and three years, respectively. A review of the
Declaration, conducted by African experts at a meeting held in Mauritius in
September 1994, resulted in a series of recommended solutions for achieving
the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration.9 The overall recommen-
dation of the experts was to incorporate the Declaration as an integral part of
national air transport policy in each African State.10 The incorporation was to be
provisionally effective immediately after the Mauritius meeting.
Later in April 1997, the Banjul Accord for an Accelerated Implementation of
the Yamoussoukro Declaration, adopted by Ghana, Sierra Leone and the
Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau and Nigeria, recognized the region repre-
senting these States as a single geographical commercial air transport operations
zone for the purpose of implementing the Yamoussoukro Declaration. The
Accord, through a joint Secretariat established for the purposes of aeronautical
co-operation within these States, offered specialized services in air traffic
services; safety oversight; market access; engineering and maintenance; com-
munications; aeronautical information services and meteorology.
Since the Yamoussoukro Declaration in 1988 some progress has been made
in the aeropolitical scene in Africa. For example, there is increasing cooperation
among airlines of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)
countries. These airlines and the countries concerned have already discussed
possibilities of operating air transport services by SADCcountry airlines
under a common logo. At the time of writing, a protocol was being considered
for the establishing of a Southern Africa Regional Air Transport Authority
(SARATA) which is a new entity that would formulate and co-ordinate air
transport policies within the SADC region and cope with emergent changes in
the air transport industry in the region.
Another recent initiative has been the Air CEDEAO project which would set
up a joint airline to serve the western sub-region of Africa. The Northern African
States have made their own contemporary contribution to the evolving air
transport scene in Africa in the form of Air Maghreba consortium for consoli-
dating and operating air transport services in Northern Africa more efficiently.
Separately, in the western sub-region, three States have initiated the establish-
ment of Air Manoa multinational airline.
States in the African continent have made significant strides in the field of
computer reservation systems (CRSs) by joining together to develop GETS
the Gabriel Extended Travel Servicea CRS launched by the SociØtØ Interna-
tionale de Telecommunications AØronautique (SITA).
Another great stride by African civil aviation has been made towards facili-
tating the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration has been the
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opening up of South Africa to intra-African aviation. Now, the developed
aviation infrastructure of South Africa is made available to African States, par-
ticularly in areas such a leasing of aircraft, engineering and maintenance
services and the training of personnel.
In the area of air navigation services and the provision of air navigation facili-
ties to aircraft, ASECNA (Agence pour la SØcuritØ de la Navigation AØrienne en
Afrique et Madagascar), the agency for the safety of air navigation in Africa and
Madagascar,11 has created ASECNA services, a subsidiary agency which
explores and facilitates numerous concomitant activities related to air transport
and air navigation in Africa. Some of the significant areas in which ASECNA
services are involved are fleet financing and management under leasing and sale
agreements.12 This activity could well give rise to the formation of an African
aircraft leasing company, in conformity with the objectives stipulated in the
Yamoussoukro Declaration.
The Air Tariff Coordination Forum of Africa (ATCOF)a new forum has
been charged with assisting the air transport industry of Africa in coping with
and adapting to the vicissitudes and vacillations of international air tariff policy
on fares and rates. This is yet another area where the African air transport and
civil aviation scene is showing signs of conforming to the objectives of the
Yamoussoukro Declaration.
In spite of the many strides made by the African nations, there are still chal-
lenges ahead with regard to the proper implementation of the Yamoussoukro
Declaration in full. These challenges are mostly in the economic field, which are
seemingly being addressed. The involvement of non-African investors in civil
aviation in Africa both from the public and private sectors, is an example of the
positive approach so far adopted in this regard.
In the legal field, considerable work has been accomplished towards bringing
about the implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration, particularly after
the Mauritius meeting of 1994. This article will address some of the more critical
legal issues that should be addressed by African States in seeking the full imple-
mentation of the provisions of the Yamoussoukro Declaration, as they approach
the next millennium.
Legal and Economic Issues
Simply stated, the Yamoussoukro Declaration is anchored upon the funda-
mental postulate of cooperation in air transport brought about by the integration
of African airlines. Toward this end, the first phase of implementation of the
Declarationwhich is given a life of two yearscarries the objective inter alia
of carrying out studies and research on air transport issues in order to integrate
African airlines harmoniously with the rest of the world air transport industry to
ensure fair competition at market access. The second phase, which is given three
years, is dedicated to commercial aspects of air transport such as the integration
of CRS, joint purchase of spare parts, maintenance and overhauling of
equipment, training of personnel, etc. The third phase, which is also allotted a
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span of three years, concerns the actual implementation of the overall integra-
tion of African airlines into a consortium of competitive commercial entities
that would bring about sustained progress in air transport in Africa that would be
capable of withstanding rapidly evolving world trends in aviation.
The Yamoussoukro Declaration brings to bear the inexorable fact that
economic and legal issues in African civil aviation are inextricably linked
together and cannot be addressed in isolation. The primary consideration and
concern facing civil aviation in Africa is uncontrovertibly the economic factor.
However, the legal infrastructure which is needed to place economic issues in
their right order follows inevitably, making it essential that the two areas of
interest are addressed together.
Although some of the objectives of the Yamoussoukro Declaration have
already been achieved at least partiallysuch as by the participation by most
African airlines in the GETS CRS systemthe most critical areas involving
overall airline management and the use of modern commercial toolssuch as
the merger of airlines and effective fleet financinghave yet to be addressed in
a comprehensive way. Although not specifically mentioned in the Declaration,
safety oversight is a factor of critical interest to African civil aviation, and has to
be addressed realistically, along with other issues raised by the Yamoussoukro
Declaration.
The Need for New Aircraft Fleets in Africa. There are two types of mega-
trends affecting the airline industry today. They are country mergers and airline
mergers. Both these trends affect the airline industry profoundly. Of these, the
unification of Europe is the largest single influence on international airlines.
From 1 January 1993, 12 European countries commenced sharing their air
traffic rights and strengthening their airlines marketing potential. There is also
a possibility that Australia and New Zealand will form a more crystallised and
intensified joint aviation market. At the intra-regional level, the most ominous
merger in recent years was the one proposed by British AirwaysKLM. If this
merger materializes, the two mega carriers, who would ordinarily benefit from
the economic unification of their two countries in the European Community,
will further consolidate their positions in the aviation world by joining forces.
This can only mean more aggressive competition by them using the usual cost
cutting synergy of joint purchasing of equipment, elimination of management
duplication and the sharing of resources. Each will also mutually eliminate a
strong competitor in the other and share access to new markets more effectively.
The proposed British AirwaysKLM merger is, however, not the only signifi-
cant regional one. SAS, Sabena, Austrian Airlines and Swissair were also
involved in grouping together in Europe to form a strategic alliance called the
European Quality Alliance. The threats posed, even at inter-regional level
with current commercial arrangements between British Airways and American
Airlines, and KLM and Northwest, are real issues that affect the commercial
viability of African airlines adversely.
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Within the two megatrends are smaller trends that individual airlines have to
follow just to remain competitive. They are privatization, the use of information
technology, removing infrastructure constraints and governmental restraints
and, most importantly, changing travel patterns. These trends have given rise to
the new phenomenon in the global aviation scene that survival (if not success) of
airlines is now dependent not on pricing but on service. This new phenomenon
calls for the airline product to be similar to the one from the entertainment
industry, bearing in mind that a passenger spends 70 percent of his total travel
time in the aircraft on long-distance flights. To counter strong alliances between
countries and airlines, the smaller carriers (as well as the big ones) are now going
in more for glamour and in-flight luxury to score on the 70 percent in-flight time.
Personal video screens for every seat, satellite assisted telephone facilities and
teleconference services are some of the luxuries offered. Indeed, as David
Shoenfeld, International Marketing Vice President of Federal Express said, if
you view your services as flying between terminals, you miss the point.
The view that marketing is determined from the view of the customer is
becoming more valuable now more than ever before. To survive, airlines have to
build brand recognition. There are 12 important factors influencing passenger
choice. They are: flight punctuality; excellence of in-flight service; superiority
of aircraft; comfortable seats; clean cabins, seats, and washrooms; good food
and beverages; superior first class; superior business class; efficient reserva-
tions systems; pricing; good check-in service; and attractive frequent flyer pro-
grammes. At least seven of these factors are entirely dependent on the quality of
the aircraft. The foremost important factorpunctualitycannot indeed be
achieved with aged aircraft. The matter becomes more crucial to a relatively
small airline, running a small fleet of aircraft, where, if one aircraft is grounded
for reasons of repair or maintenance, the entire flight schedule of the airline
would be in disarray, leading to delays down the line. Connecting services
would be disrupted and passengers stranded. It is needless to envisage the effect
this catastrophe would have on the airlines good name. No amount of superior
in-flight service would atone for a six-hour delay where a connecting passenger
has to sit inside an unknown airport terminal. It is therefore necessary for any
airline to seriously consider removing one of its most burdensome infra-
structural constraintsits ageing aircraft.
Another compelling reason for airlines to modernize their fleets is that ageing
aircraft do not conform to noise restrictions imposed by many countries and thus
face being barred from certain airports. The noise issue has become a crucial
environment issue in the world aviation community. At the 27th Session of the
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) held in
Montreal in 1989, when the matter of possible noise restrictions on subsonic jet
aircraft was taken up, the main concern of the Assembly was to achieve a
balance between the desire to protect the environment around airports against
unnecessary noise and the desire to avoid excessive costs associated with accel-
erated replacement of noisier aircraft, particularly where these aircraft were reg-
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istered in countries which did not themselves intend to introduce noise-related
operating instructions. In one of their past Sessional discussions, Airport
Council International (ACI) noted that aircraft noise represents a major con-
straint upon the future viability and capacity of the aviation system. Unless
concerted international action was taken, there would be a proliferation of
various local legislation banning noisy aircraft from their airportsa measure
that would have a devastating effect on air commerce. The International Air
Transport Association (IATA) representing the airlines at the Session noted that
the airline industry recognized the need in many States to address political and
other concerns relating to the environment and the fact that the noise climate in
areas adjacent to airports is linked to the ability of airports to provide expanded
travel facilities to meet the growing demand of air travel. The ICAO Assembly
ultimately decided that further time was necessary for consultation and analysis
with a view to reaching consensus, and deferred the issue to the 28th Session
(Extraordinary) of the Assembly which was held in Montreal in October 1990.
At its 28th Session (Extraordinary), the ICAO Assembly, by its Resolution
A28-3 resolved to urge States not to commence phasing out noisy aircraft until 1
April 1995, and to spread out the phasing in period over seven years from 1 April
1995, so that airlines would have time to renew their aircraft fleets or hush-kit
(silence the engines of aircraft) them to conform to prescribed noise levels.
ICAO further urged States not to restrict before the end of the phase-in period the
operations of any aircraft less than 25 years of age from the date the aircraft was
issued its first certificate of airworthiness and to assist aircraft operators in their
efforts to accelerate fleet modernization.
The standards of the international community on ageing aircraft are now
clear. States have been given the right by the international civil aviation
community to start phasing out aircraft from 1 April 1995 until the year 2002.
This means that airlines that have ageing aircraft in their fleets would have to
commence modernizing their fleets soon. If they fail to modernize their fleet
their ageing aircraft would not be admitted to countries which have phased them
out by legislation. The need for modernizing ageing aircraft fleets has become
more compelling than ever, and is amply reflected by the recommendations
made by the Fourth Meeting of ICAOs Committee on Aviation Environmental
Protection (CAEP) which was held from 6 to 8 April 1998. CAEP has recom-
mended the reduction by an average of about 16 per cent levels of nitrogen
oxides that aircraft engines are currently allowed to emit under Annex 16 to the
Chicago Convention.13 CAEP has also recommended that States implement
ICAOs new Communications, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Man-
agement systems (CNS/ATM), thereby implicitly requiring aircraft to be
equipped with the modern facilities onboard to comply with the satellite naviga-
tion systems introduced by the CNS/ATM systems.
Another commitment made by CAEP at its Fourth Meeting is to carry out
more work in the future to establish new noise standards for jet aeroplanes that
would be more stringent than the present Chapter 3 standards in Annex 16.14
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This seriously impacts African airlines, requiring them to consider the moderni-
zation of their fleets.
Despite a Gulf war in 1990, and the recession in the early nineties, industry
growth has remained strong throughout the decade. European traffic growth is
estimated at five percent and growth forecasts for the Asia-Pacific are 8.6
percent per annum. Macdonnell Douglas in its Outlook for Commercial Aircraft
1988-2002, forecasts a sustained growth rate of worldwide commercial
passenger traffic at 5.7 percent per annum. Worldwide cargo capacity demand
has been forecast at a six percent annual rate through the year 2002. During the
next 15 years, worldwide generic demand for new passenger aircraft is forecast
at 5,888 units with an estimated value of U.S.$302 billion, and a total generic
demand at 413 full cargo freighters through the year 2002.
Apart from the compelling marketing reasons and environmental factors
discussed above, a modernized fleet in an African airline would succeed in
sweeping the airline to success if the acquisition of aircraft is managed
prudently. For example, the new aircraft would have to be placed in the fleet just
before the airline reaches peak utilization of its aircraft. New air traffic rights of
the airlines would have to be negotiated beforehand and existing ones reviewed
for maximum utilization. The fixed costs of the new aircraft would have to be
analysed well beforehand to maximise profits. The resale value of the aircraft,
when they are ultimately phased out in order that newer aircraft are brought in,
should also be given serious consideration. Engineering and maintenance facili-
ties and costs thereof of new aircraft also have to be carefully thought out.
To capitalize on changes in their competitive environment, competent airline
managers now need to know that in the foreseeable future there will be a few
mega-carriers operating in America, Europe, Asia and the Pacific Rim and that
these carriers probably will be composites of strong strategic alliances between
powerful airlines and powerful regional States. They would be well equipped to
offer the quality of service and punctuality that modern glamour requires of air
travel. To compete with these carriers for a fair share of the market, a smaller
African airline would have to offer a comparable product. In order to offer this
type of product airline managers in Africa have to consider the global issues now
facing the world of civil aviation and, above all, the ways and means to adapt to
the sweeping trends of the rest of the world in aviation.
Although the standards of management in African airlines are currently of a
high standard, these airlines need to constantly update their management profile
to adapt to the rapidly changing global aviation scene as envisaged by the
Yamoussoukro Declaration. For this purpose, airline managers have to be con-
stantly trained in such issues as market access and benefits that could be derived
through Africas strategic position in the world, market resources available, the
efficient use of commercial torts such as outsourcing15 and franchising16 and the
ensuring of aviation safety within Africa. With the trend of liberalization sweep-
ing the world, African airline managers have to be particularly mindful of the
various arrangements between mega-countries which now admit to open skies.
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Market Access. At the time of writing, the United States and the United
Kingdom were discussing deregulating air transport between the countries. The
talks were aimed at replacing the U.K.U.S. bilateral air services agreement
with an open skies agreement, which would allow the market to determine
prices, routes and scheduling. The United States already has signed open skies
agreements with the Netherlands and Germany, although an agreement for open
skies with the United Kingdom could be at a much larger scale considering the
frequency of air services between the two countries. One of the problem areas
that were being ironed out at the discussions was the reported apprehension of
the United Kingdom authorities that an open skies policy between the United
Kingdom and the United States, if fully implemented, would give American
carriers access to countries beyond the United Kingdom with full commercial
traffic rights (i.e. the right to carry passengers between the United Kingdom and
third countries) whereas British carriers had no rights to fly between destina-
tions in the United States.17
According to a study carried out in the United States, a liberalized open skies
agreement with the United Kingdom will provide a five year, $108 billion boost
to the United States economy and create 152,000 new jobs. The study projects a
five-year period of steady growth and an estimated 9.4 million new passengers a
year who would take advantage of the 86 percent increase in air services
between the two countries if an open skies policy is implemented18 and help
introduce U.S.U.K. air services from 12 new U.S. cities.19 American Airlines
chairman Robert Crandall sums up the view of the US carriers on an open skies
policy between the two countries:
This study confirms what we have been saying for some time open skies with the
UK will be good for passengers, shippers and communities across the country by
providing new service, more competition and lower fares in the transatlantic
market.20
Earlier, in June 1996, Japan rejected a proposal by the United States for an
open skies agreement on somewhat similar grounds as the British, that U.S.
carriers have unlimited rights to fly beyond Japan under the current bilateral air
services agreement which was signed in 1952 by the two countries. In return,
Japan Airlines, the only Japanese airline at that time, has no comparable
benefit.21 Japan has openly claimed that it does not support the U.S. version of
open skies for two reasons: (1) Japan would not have access to the large U.S.
domestic market and; (2) open skies does not take into account inconsistencies
created by capacity constraints in airports such as Narita and Kansai.22 The
United States, on the other hand, maintains that Japanese authorities seem more
intent on protecting intra-Asian air service markets for Japanese carriers by
blocking out U.S. carrier competitors than they are in opening the U.S.Japan
aviation market.23
The United States carriers have, to their favour, consistently advocated an
open skies policy throughout the world. In May 1996, Delta Airlines Chief
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Executive Ronald Allen called upon the European Union to enter into an open
skies agreement with the United States. Allen contended that open skies are
useful because they remove government restrictions on every aspect of aviation
except for safety and predatory market behaviour and concluded that an open
skies policy would result in a more vibrant market place where consumers are
allowed to select among the best, most efficient and most competitive
operators.24
The United States has also sought open skies agreements with some Asian
countries. In September 1995, U.S. authorities signed a Memorandum of Under-
standing with the authorities of Hong Kong which liberalized to a large extent
existing arrangements for the carriage of cargo by air between the two
countries.25 Singapore Airlines has been a staunch supporter of the open skies
policy and has openly called for its implementation between Asia and the United
States. According to Singapore Airlines Chairman Cheong Choong Kong:
The U.S. and Singapore agree that liberalizing aviation is in the best interests not
only of the consumers but of the economy generally through the stimulation of
trade I hope therefore that the U.S. will extend its open skies to cover the Asia-
Pacific region, which, based on traffic forecasts is going to be the largest aviation
market within 15 years.26
Later, in December 1996, Cheong was critical of the stance taken by the
United States in response to the offer of open skies by Singapore and Malaysia.
He said:
it was no secret that open skies bilaterals with Singapore and Malaysia were attain-
able right away but unfortunately it was all or nothing with them [U.S.]; they
insisted on a critical mass of willing countries before they would proceed. Appar-
ently, Malaysia and Singapore did not constitute such a critical mass.27
He has also extended his comments on liberalization to Australia and New
Zealand, claiming that those countries should open their markets so that tourists
can fly in and out of, and, more importantly within their territories more conven-
iently28 thus suggesting that such markets should not be protected and preserved
only for the national carriers of Australia and New Zealand.
On the subject of critical mass in Asia, the suggestion made by the Prime
Minister of Malaysia in October 1995, that Asia-Pacific nations must adopt a
common stand in talks with the United States, is significant. The key contention
of Asian countries against most developed countries in the west is that the laters
enthusiasm for open skies is tainted by their refusal to lay open their domestic
markets within the open skies package. This refusal, it is claimed, only reflects a
cosmetic balance between countries which do not have extensive domestic
markets and thosesuch as the United Stateswhich do. Prime Minister
Mohamad articulated:
Asia-Pacific nations must be prepared to act in concert and adopt a coordinated
stance in negotiating with the E.U. and the U.S. the consequence of not doing so
Abeyratne 39
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol 3 No 2 1998 Page
will likely be the domination of the aviation industry by the mega carriers from the
U.S. and Europe.29
In January 1997, officials from the United States and Singapore reached an
open skies aviation deal, making Singapore the first Asian country to sign an
open skies deal with the United States.30 The U.S.Singapore deal followed a
preliminary meeting in October 1996 which included South Korea, Taiwan,
Malaysia and Brunei. On 10 January 1997 the United States also re-opened its
negotiations with Japan and is expected to seek progress towards an open skies
agreement in 1997.
In the above context, it cannot be claimed incontrovertibly that an open skies
policy, as advocated by the various proponents is not totally lacking in overpro-
tectiveness. Most nations still give an unusually high priority to the marketing
policies of their airlines, which are naturally geared to world protectionism and
exploitation. An ideal open skies policy should be such as the one practised by
Dubai, where, irrespective of reciprocity, unlimited access to air traffic rights is
given to any who wish to operate air services. Maurice Flanagan, Group
Managing Director of Emirates (the airline of Dubai) writes:
Open skies describes the situation in which a country allows unlimited traffic rights
to the airlines of other countries, almost always on a reciprocal basis and is not all
common.Open skies usually results from bilateral negotiation. Singapore, however,
places open skies on the table immediately, and, if the other side reciprocates, there
the negotiations end. Holland is much the same. But Dubai grants open skies uncon-
ditionally, i.e. without requesting reciprocity, which is unique for a place which has
its own airline.31
Whichever way the open skies policy is interpreted, and whatever is the
nature of the practice, it is inevitable that liberalization would impact market
forces and affect airlines differently. With free market competition expanding
around the globe in the recent past and the emergence of free trade agreements
such as NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), EFTA (European
Free Trade Agreement), and free market forces within the European Union, the
collapse of the communist economy in most countries including the former
U.S.S.R. and increasingly new consumer demands in Japan, it is a necessary
corollary that protectionism in commercial aviation should give way to some
degree of liberalization in the least.
African airlines are therefore faced with the imminent prospect of the future
realm of commercial aviation being controlled by a group of air carriers which
may serve whole global regions and operated by a network of commercial and
trade agreements. Regional carriers will be predominant, easing out niche
carriers and small national carriers whose economics would be inadequate to
compare their costs with the lower unit costs and joint ventures of a larger
carrier. It is arguable that a perceived justification for open skies or unlimited
liberalization exists even today in the bilateral air services agreement between
two countries, where, fair and equal opportunity to operate air services is a sine
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qua non for both national carriers concerned. This has been re-interpreted to
mean fair and equal opportunity to compete and later still, fair and equal oppor-
tunity to effectively participate in the international air transportation as agreed.32
Of course, there has been no universal acceptance of this evolution in
interpretation.
ICAO has suggested the following preferential measures for the considera-
tion and possible use of its member States who are at a competitive disadvantage
when faced with the mega trends of commercial aviation and market access:
a) the asymmetric liberalization of market access in a bilateral air transport
relationship to give an air carrier of a developing country: more cities to
serve; fifth freedom traffic rights33 on sectors which are otherwise not
normally granted; flexibility to operate unilateral services on a given route
for a certain period of time; and the right to serve greater capacity for an
agreed period of time;
b) more flexibility for air carriers of developing countries (than their coun-
terparts in developed countries) in changing capacity between routes in a
bilateral agreement situation; code-sharing to markets of interest to them;
and changing gauge (aircraft types) without restrictions;
c) the allowance of trial periods for carriers of developing countries to
operate on liberal air service arrangements for an agreed time;
d) gradual introduction by developing countries (in order to ensure participa-
tion by their carriers) to more liberal market access agreements for longer
periods of time than developed countries air carriers;
e) use of liberalized arrangements at a quick pace by developing countries
carriers;
f) waiver of nationality requirement for ownership of carriers of developing
countries on a subjective basis;
g) allowance for carriers of developing countries to use more modern aircraft
through the use of liberal leasing agreements;
h) preferential treatment in regard to slot allocations at airports; and
i) more liberal forms for carriers of developing countries in arrangements
for ground handling at airports, conversion of currency at their foreign
offices and employment of foreign personnel with specialized skills.34
These proposed preferential measures are calculated to give air carriers of
developing countries a head start which would effectively ensure their
continued participation in competition with other carriers for the operation of
international air services. Furthermore, improved market access and operational
flexibility are two benefits which are considered as direct corollaries to the
measures proposed.
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While the open skies policy sounds economically expedient, its implementa-
tion would undoubtedly phase out smaller carriers who are now offering compe-
tition in air transport and a larger spectrum of air transport to the consumer.
Lower fares, different types of services and varied in-flight service profiles are
some of the features of the present system. It is desirable that a higher level of
competitiveness prevails in the air transport industry, and to achieve this
objective, preferential measures for carriers of developing countries would play
a major role.
In addition, to addressing the preferential measures proposed by ICAO,
which would be of immense assistance to carriers of developing countries if
implemented, it would be prudent for the international aviation and trading
community to consider the larger issue of funding, whereby long-term low-
interest loans could be made available to carriers of developing countries
through such institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund. Some consideration could also be given to a balanced distribution of
aircraft throughout the world, whereby developing countries could have access
to aircraft which have been discarded by their more affluent counterparts. An
equitable system of leasing these aircraft is a possibility that could be
considered.
The exemption of aircraft operated by carriers of developing countries from
technological standards (to the extent possible) which may apply to modern
aircraft is another useful tool which could be addressed under the umbrella of
preferential measures. Aircraft engine emission standards and noise regulations
are some examples which could be examined.35
Preferential measures may also be considered on a collective basis whereby
air traffic rights could be used by a carrier of one country on behalf of another
carrier representing another country. This would help, particularly in the event
of a developing country not being able to launch its own airline or is unable to
allocate its national carrier on a particular route due to economic reasons. This
principle could also be extended to cover instances where airlines from develop-
ing countries could combine their operations by using their collective air traffic
rights. For example, airlines of countries A and B who have been granted air
traffic rights to operate air services from their countries to countries C and D,
respectively, would be able to operate one joint service to countries C and D in
one flight, using their collective traffic rights under this scheme.
It could be argued on behalf of the African airlines that as far as possible,
developing countries should be released from the obligation to own and control
their air carriers or to have their carriers substantially owned and controlled by
their nationals. It is only then that countries which cannot fully finance their
carriers could maintain them and provide well-rounded competition in the air
transport industry.
Aviation Safety. Safety is the primary concern of the world aviation
community at the present time. It is not only because the fundamental postulates
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of the Chicago Convention36 call for the safe and orderly development of inter-
national civil aviation37 and mandate ICAO to insure the safe and orderly growth
of international civil aviation throughout the world38 but also because the
aviation world faces a critical era where, in the words of Dr. Assad Kotaite,
President of the ICAO Council:
the international aviation community cannot afford to relax its vigilanceICAO
would continue to take timely action to ensure safety and security standards are in
effect, and that deficiencies are properly and efficiently addressed.39
The compelling need for higher standards in aviation safety was formally
recognized when the ICAO Council adopted ICAOs Strategic Action Plan on 7
February 1997. The basic strategic objective of the Plan is to further the safety,
security and efficiency of international civil aviation. ICAO plans to accomplish
this task by assisting States in identifying deficiencies in the implementation of
Annexes to the Chicago Convention.
One of the core elements of ICAO activity on safety, according to its
Strategic Action Plan, is to carry out assessments by teams of experts of the
capacity of participating States to control effectively the level of safety for
which they have responsibility. ICAOs Safety Oversight Programme, which
would implement this activity, extends to personnel licensing, operation of
aircraft and aircraft airworthiness. ICAO may, in the foreseeable future, extend
ICAOs Safety Oversight Programme to cover areas such as air traffic control
and the operation of airports.
Taking a cue from ICAO, several regional aviation organizations have
formally incorporated safety provisions in their documentation. The African
Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC), at its Thirteenth Plenary Session (Abuja,
11-18 May 1995) discussed the matter of safety oversight in Africa, which led to
the Commission adopting Decision S13-340 on Safety Oversight. This decision
recognizes that States must take appropriate means to ensure compliance with
international safety standards contained in the relevant Annexes to the Chicago
Convention and that most African States may not have the necessary infrastruc-
ture to fully implement such standards. The Commission refers to the ICAO
Safety Oversight Programme in Decision S13-3 and instructs the AFCAC
Bureau to improve safety oversight in AFCAC activities and promote co-
operation among African States in the field of safety oversight. Through the
Decision, AFCAC has also requested ICAOs assistance for African States in
order that they could effectively introduce the Safety Oversight Programme in
Africa.
The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) at its 100th Meeting of
Directors General of Civil Aviation (Paris, 14-15 May 1997) discussed an
ECAC Recommendation on Safety of Foreign Aircraft41 which calls for
increased ramp checks on aircraft and rigid adherence, on a bilateral basis, by
States of the provisions of the Chicago Convention on licensing of personnel
and certification of aircraft.42
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The ECAC bilateral safety clause calls in limine for consultations to be
called for at any stage where such consultations would relate to safety standards
of aircrew, aircraft or the operation of aircraft. The provision allows for the revo-
cation of the clause if one party to the agreement finds that the other does not
maintain minimum ICAO Standards. The clause also admits of the need to con-
duct random ramp checks in order for one party to determine whether aircraft
conform to Article 33 of the Chicago Conventionwhich relates to certification
of airworthiness. At the same meeting, ECAC also discussed a recommenda-
tion43 on leasing of aircraft and safety, which calls for Standards as prescribed in
Annex 6 (Operation of Aircraft) to the Chicago Convention and minimum con-
ditions on the use of leased aircraft, to ensure that they are maintained in accor-
dance with ICAO Standards of Safety. It must be noted that safety regulations of
the European Community are generally stringent, on product liability44 which
stipulate that any person who imports into the community a product for leasing
is considered a manufacturer of that product for purposes of product liability.
Another regional civil aviation organization which has recognized the com-
pelling need for the implementation of safety oversight in its region is the Latin
American Civil Aviation Commission (LACAC). At LACACs Eleventh
Assembly (Manaus, 7-10 November 1994) some LACAC member States
adopted the Manaus Declaration which expressed its support of the role of the
ICAO Council to establish a safety oversight programme and requested ICAO
to implement the programme as quickly as possible.45
Both ICAO and the regional aviation organization have focussed their
attention on the air navigational aspects of safety oversight. This is understanda-
bly so, since safety of civil aviation primarily depends on safe air navigation.
However, safety of civil aviation does not stop at air navigation. There are other
extraneous factors which may impact aviation safety, such as human conduct in
the aircraft and air traffic controller liability. The management of these areas of
activity are as crucial to African civil aviation as the overall ensuring of aviation
safety through satellite communication systems.
Taking the above analogies into consideration, the African States should, in
the final analysis, consider that one of the most important management issues
for Africa concerns the safety of civil aviation. Regulation in Africa on this
subject should be introduced on the fundamental basis that air transport is now a
high technology intensive industry and any regulation promulgated must be
focussed on a proactive and not reactive approach. Aviation management must
target through regulation such aspects as cross culture communications in the
cockpit and cabin, enhanced automation in the cockpit, and a common policy on
crew conduct based on available statistics on disruptive passenger conduct. For
the last measure to attain fruition, a unified system of collecting information on
disruptive behaviour must be implemented. The most important step, at this
juncture, is for the African aviation community to support studies which may be
initiated by ICAO in the necessary and relevant areas related to the overall issue
of aviation safety.46
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CONCLUSION
The principal instrumentality of airline cooperation in Africa is the African
Airlines Association (AFRAA), which is the only such organ in the region that
enables African airlines to collaborate in their air services and the services
provided by any air transport enterprise within Africa, in the pursuit of the
airline integration envisaged by the Yamoussoukro Declaration.47 On the regu-
latory side, the African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC) coordinates
policy, technical and coordination issues with ICAO and IATA without actually
involving itself with airline issues directly. This two-pronged modality has
somehow to converge at the focal point of the Yamoussoukro Declarations
airline integration policy, if a meaningful adaptation by the African airlines to
the global trends in aviation is to attain fruition.
The fact that such an integration is possible is amply evidenced by the 1961
YaoundØ Treaty and the later African Joint Air Services (AJAS) accord signed
by and between Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The latter provided for the
establishment of an independent air transport operating agency within Article
77 of the Chicago Convention to operate air services in intercontinental routes
on behalf of Air Tanzania, Uganda Airlines and Zambia Airways, together with
Air Maghreb (which is actually a combination of the airlines of Algeria, Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) and Air Mano, consisting
of the carriers Air Guinea, Air Liberia and Sierra Leone Airways.
In addition to this airline integration, it is encouraging to note that the restruc-
turing and commercialization which started in Africa in 1992 has yielded
positive results. More African airlines are veering from the flag carrier notion
and going to for self reliance, privatization and delinking themselves from gov-
ernmental control. The privatization of Kenya Airways and the turnaround of
Air Tanzania and Uganda Airlines are good examples of a progressive African
air transport industry.
However, considered wholly, African civil aviation, with the exception of the
few airlines already mentioned, has failed to show that it could contribute posi-
tively to national economic integration and development. Moreover, African
airlines in general have shown over the past few years the need for a manage-
ment approach that could cope with global trends in civil aviation.
Nonetheless, the prognosis for the future of African air transport is far from
gloomy. Although African airlines do not yet contribute to the regional
economy, it is encouraging that over the 1985-1995 period, the scheduled
airlines of the African region showed an annual increase in operating revenues
in U.S. dollars at the rate of 5.4 percent48 compared with a world annual average
of 9.1 percent and positive overall operating results have been achieved by these
airlines since 1992.49
During 1996 ten airlines in the world showed progress towards privatization,
five of which were from Africa.50
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Obviously, the potential for achieving full maturity within the global chal-
lenges faced by Africa remains within the African States and their airlines them-
selves. Autonomy in civil aviation authorities, the aggressive development of
infrastructure, and personnel training is the key that could open the door to
strategic African airline management within the Yamoussoukro Declaration.
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ABSTRACT
In November and December of 1994, investigators from Southern Illinois University, Carbondale,
conducteda surveyof based-users and transient-usersof PalwaukeeMunicipalAirport ofWheeling,
Illinois. Palwaukee is designated as a reliever airport by the Federal Aviation Administration and
thereby eligible for federal funding.The purpose of the studywas to determineuser satisfactionwith
the airport, its services, and its facilities. The study appraised among other areas, whether or not and
to what degree users were satisfied with Palwaukee and if they were considering a move to another
location. The survey detailed user rationale for satisfaction and/or dissatisfaction with Palwaukee
and the potential for relocation. The survey takes a comprehensive approach to identifying based-
user and transient-user levels of satisfaction at Palwaukee. The full range of aircraft operators per-
manently based there as well as transient aircraft operators passing through were considered in the
survey.
Generally the survey determined that based-users were satisfied with Palwaukees facilities, serv-
ices, and management. Responses were distinguished by types of aircraft operated. And, although
not a majority in each area, significant numbers of based-userswere found to be considering reloca-
tion.
Transient-users expressed satisfaction with the quality of fixed based operator services, facilities,
and air traffic control. They expressed dissatisfactionwith airport pavement, availability of parallel
runways, and costs of fuel.
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INTRODUCTION
Customer satisfaction is an increasingly important aspect of any service-
oriented business. Due to serious questions being raised by airport users and by
airport commission members, a survey of customer satisfaction at a general
aviation airport was conducted in Illinois in 1994.
The Palwaukee Municipal Airport Commission (PMAC) contracted with
Southern Illinois University, Carbondale (SIUC), to conduct a study of
customer satisfaction at Palwaukee Municipal Airport, Wheeling-Prospect
Heights, Illinois (PWK). Seven large general aviation airports in the Chicago
region; Aurora, Dupage, Lake-in-the-Hills, Lansing, Lewis, Palwaukee, and
Waukegan are Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) designated reliever
airports. Each of these airports accommodate piston and jet aircraft for business
and personal use. Of the seven, PWK is the closest to Chicago, just 18 miles to
the northwest of downtown and only about seven miles north of OHare Interna-
tional Airport.
The purpose of this paper is to present the results of the customer satisfaction
survey conducted by SIUC in late 1994. Thought to be the first of its kind, the
survey covers both based-users and transient-users, and provides insights into
the needs and wants of customers served by a large general aviation reliever
airport. The survey itself was designed to assess the satisfaction of based-users
and transient-users with PWKs services, facilities, and management. Future
needs, from a service perspective, were also evaluated. In particular, the report
gauges the extent to which airport clients were considering basing their aircraft
at other regional airports and analyzes client rationale in considering relocation.
The report first discusses study design and reports the major findings of two
survey instruments. It then addresses issues upon which PWK customers
exhibited strong satisfaction and those for which they shared much concern.
Survey questions and responses are provided in Appendix A for based-users and
Appendix B for transient-users. The report concludes by suggesting options for
PMAC to consider in light of the findings.
General Aviation in the Reliever Airport Role
General aviation, basically every other type of aviation endeavor excluding
scheduled passenger transportation, does not always fit cohesively with large
commercial airport operations. The myriad services provided by general
aviation operators, which is not totally inclusive of aerial photography, sky
diving, air evacuation, corporate/executive transportation, air taxi, and charter,
illustrate the need to separate commercial carriers and general aviation. Even
though large corporate aircraft fit easily into the commercial carrier environ-
ment, their flexible schedules may cause perturbations to commercial airports
operations. Add in the full range of general aviation aircraft, single and multi-
engine piston aircraft, single and multi-engine turbo-prop aircraft, corporate
aircraft, and rotorcraft, and the scene becomes more complicated and far more
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difficult to manage efficiently and effectively. Since general aviation does not
share any interdependent relationship with the major carriers or the
regional/commuter airlines there is little justification to mix these incompatible
operations. Safety is a paramount issue that must be taken into consideration as
well. On June 23, 1998, a student pilot crashed and died on final approach to
John Wayne International Airport in Orange County, California. Probable cause
of the accident was wake turbulence generated by a Boeing 757 landing at the
airport ahead of the student pilot (NTSB, 1998). Probably the worst example of
mixing general aviation with major carrier operations occurred on September
25, 1978, at San Diegos Lindbergh Airport. A Pacific Southwest Airlines
Boeing 727 collided with a Cessna 172. The crash killed the student pilot, his
instructor, and everyone aboard the Pacific Southwest airliner (NTSB, 1979).
Reliever airports are intended to resolve these operationally incompatible and
potentially unsafe aircraft operations by providing a place for general aviation
users to operate away from commercially serviced airports, but still have access
to major metropolitan areas.
The United States Congress defines a reliever airport as one which relieves
congestion at a commercial airport and provides general aviation access to the
community (United States General Accounting Office [GAO], 1994).
According to this GAO report, funding was allocated through the FAAs Airport
Improvement Plan (AIP) to reliever airports meeting the following criteria.
The airport should have at least 50 aircraft based at the airport or a minimum 35,000
annual operations (take-offs and landings). FAAmay also name an airport a reliever
if it determines that the airport is in a desirable location for instrument training activ-
ity. With FAAs concurrence, state and local planning authorities can designate an
airport as a reliever even if it does not meet the above criteria. (1994, p. 3)
In 1994 there were 329 reliever airports designated by the FAA with 246 of
these linked with a major commercial airport (GAO, 1994). Typically, linked
relievers are located near a major metropolitan areas primary air carrier airport,
are capable of handling corporate jets, have an instrument landing system (ILS)
for all-weather operations, sell jet fuel, and have comprehensive general
aviation services available for their customers (GAO, 1994). As is indicated by
the GAO report the designation of a reliever can be quite broad and open to inter-
pretation by the FAA, state, and local governments. Data suggests a moderate
correlation among the criteria used to designate an airport as a reliever. With the
exception of having an ILS, no more than two relievers illustrated have more
than two qualifiers which are comparable. For example, VanNuys, California,
and Deer Valley, Arizona, have similar runway lengths, comparable numbers of
based aircraft, however annual operations and number of Fixed Base Operators
(FBOs) vary widely. Hooks, Texas, and Teterboro, New Jersey, also have similar
runway lengths and comparable numbers of based aircraft, here again annual
operations and numbers of FBOs vary. Palwaukee, Illinois, with the shortest
runway, rates fourth in annual operations, registers third in number of based
aircraft, with the only comparable qualifier being the number of FBOs (see
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Table 1). An indication that even nationally reliever airport size and facilities are
just as diverse as the aircraft they service.
Palwaukee Airport is an FAA designated reliever airport which serves a wide
range of general aviation needs. Palwaukee is considered to be linked with
Chicagos OHare International Airport. The diversity of services provided at
PWK are directly proportional to the diversity of aircraft and operations
conducted there. Fuel needs vary from MOGAS (automobile gasoline), to 100
Low Lead, to Jet A/B. Some aircraft owners/operators are satisfied with a simple
tie-down, others require that their aircraft be hangared. Some owners/operators
perform a majority of their own maintenance while others have a local FBO
perform all of their maintenance.
According to Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) documentation
Northeastern Illinois airport utilization has been stable from 1981 through 1994.
There was virtually no change from 1981 through 1991. However, in 1992
PWKs share dropped from 22.8 percent to 18.5 percent, declining further in
1993 to 15.9 percent, and then increasing to about 17 percent in 1994 (IDOT,
1994). Figure 1 represents this data for the 10 year period 1985 through 1994.
Additional IDOT data (by type of based aircraft) corroborated this trend. Since
1988, and particularly since 1991, based-user aircraft totals were down for
single-engine, multi-engine, and jet aircraft at PWK (1994).
A comparison between IDOT official airport inventory data and inventory
numbers reported by survey respondents draws a similar profile of the based-
user population at PWK. Respondent and IDOT data indicate, when compared,
that the majority of aircraft at PWK are single-engine, that multi-engine aircraft
data deviates by five aircraft, jet aircraft data deviates by three aircraft, with
rotorcraft data deviating by one aircraft (see Table 2). For the sake of compari-
son jet includes turbo-prop and turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft types.
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Table 1
Selected Reliever Airport Data - 1997
Number of Number of Number
Reliever Longest NAV Annual Based of
Airport Runway Aides Operations Aircraft FBOs
Van Nuys, California (VNY) 8,000 x 150 ILS 583,170 715 5
Hooks, TX (DWH) 7000 x 100 ILS 146,870 291 1
Deer Valley, AZ (DVT) 8200 x 100 ILS 216,026 748 2
Teterboro, NJ (TEB) 7000 x 150 ILS 209,667 289 4
Palwaukee, IL (PWK) 5001 x 100 ILS 188,193 347 2
Note. Data were compiled from Santos, (1997, Airport Information).
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METHODOLOGY
Between August and early November of 1994, SIUC investigators worked
closely with PMAC in developing two survey instruments to study customer
satisfaction with PWK facilities, services, and management. Each survey instru-
ment addressed different perspectives from which based-user and transient-user
customers utilized airport facilities and services. Survey instruments also
accounted for types and numbers of aircraft operated by PWK based-users and
transient-users (i.e., single-engine piston, multi-engine piston, turbo-prop,
turbo-jet/turbo-fan, and rotorcraft) who responded to the surveys. It must be
noted that Rotorcraft responses were included within turbo-jet/turbo-fan types
of aircraft by their owner/operators.
Investigators mailed the based-user survey instrument to all PWK customers
basing one or more aircraft at PWK as of November 14, 1994. The listing of
based-users was supplied to investigators by PMAC. Investigators then mailed
additional surveys on December 12, 1994 to customers not returning the initial
survey. Over 160 based-user surveys were ultimately returned for a response
rate of approximately 58 percent.
Three hundred transient-user survey instruments were mailed to customers
selected at random from listings provided by Priester Aviation and Service Avia-
tion, PWKs two FBOs (a total of 150 customers were selected from each of the
two FBOs). The initial and follow-up mailings of the transient-user surveys took
place in November and December 1994, respectively. Of three hundred
transient-user customers surveyed, 121 of these (40 percent) responded.
The survey instruments solicited factual data about PWKs customers and
their airport utilization such as what type of aircraft were flown, for what pur-
pose, frequency of operations, and amount of fuel purchased at PWK and at
other airports annually. The surveys also assessed current satisfaction with serv-
ices, facilities, and management at PWK. Moreover, the survey asked customers
about future needs at PWK.
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Table 2
Number of Aircraft Based at PWK by Customers Responding to Based-user Survey
Compared to 1994 IDOT Inventory
Type of Aircraft 1994 Based-user Survey Results 1994 IDOT Inventory
Single-engine 120 239
Multi-engine 34 39
Jet 54 57
Rotorcraft 3 2
Total 210 337
Note. Some respondents operate more than one aircraft. For the purposes of comparison jet is inclusive of turbo-
prob, turbo-jet and turbo-fan aircraft.
Most survey questions assessed attitudes and perceptions of customers
regarding suitability of current facilities, services, and management and what
they think the future holds for PWK. Consequently, questions were mostly
close-ended and required based-users to relate the degree to which they were
either satisfied or in agreement with statements about PWK facilities, services,
and management. A five-point scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is totally dissatisfied and
5 is extremely satisfied) identifies degree of respondent satisfaction or agree-
ment. The surveys also included a few open-ended questions that let respon-
dents volunteer additional comments about PWK facilities, services, and
management in their own words. Appendix A and B include survey questions
and responses. Responses are indicated by bold print. Responses for open-ended
questions are not provided due to their variety and number.
Based-user Survey Results
The factual data, such as the type of aircraft flown, was not only useful for
profiling customers based at PWK, but was extremely helpful in deciphering
and pinning down assessments of facilities and services. For instance about 33
percent of based-user respondents used their aircraft for business, another 40
percent mostly for pleasure, and about 27 percent for business and pleasure.
When these percentages are broken down by the types of aircraft based at PWK
it was determined that 92 percent of customers basing turbo-jet aircraft at PWK
flew mostly for business purposes, none of which flew mostly for pleasure, and
only about 8 percent flew for business and pleasure. This contrasts sharply with
single-engine, and multi-engine aircraft use. Of these two types of aircraft only
about 13 percent of single-engine and 33 percent of multi-engine aircraft were
flown mostly for business, while 56 percent of single-engine aircraft and 32 per-
cent of multi-engine aircraft flew mostly for pleasure, and 30 percent and 33 per-
cent flew mostly for business and pleasure, respectfully.
Different types of aircraft have different operational needs and serve differ-
ent purposes. Survey results for aircraft utilization and fuel consumption indi-
cated that turbo-prop, turbo-jet, and turbo-fan aircraft logged considerably more
flight hours, consumed more fuel, and were far more likely to anticipate increas-
ing their use of PWK over the next five years.
Satisfaction With Facilities
The survey asked based-users to respond to a series of close-ended questions
concerning current availability and condition of runways/taxiways, storage and
parking, and FBO services.
Runways and Taxiways. Generally, based-user customers did not agree
about the suitability of PWKs facilities. For instance, many respondents were
satisfied, or extremely satisfied with runway width, availability of parallel taxi-
ways, and condition of aviation pavements. However, just as many were less sat-
isfied, neutral, or dissatisfied. Overall, based-users were satisfied with runway
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length. Over 56 percent indicated they were either satisfied with or extremely
satisfied with current runway lengths at PWK.
Evaluations of runway length, width, and to a lesser extent, pavement condi-
tion differed by types of aircraft based at PWK. For instance, whereas over 70
percent of single-engine and 65 percent of multi-engine aircraft operators
reported they were satisfied or extremely satisfied with length of runways, only
33 percent of the turbo-prop and 8 percent of turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft opera-
tors said they were satisfied.
Storage and Parking. There was a general lack of consensus about parking
and storage availability. Responses were fairly evenly spread across all five
types of aircraft owned/operated even though the answer most often given con-
cerning parking availability was dissatisfied. Turbo-prop and turbo-jet custom-
ers were noticeably more satisfied with parking and storage space availability .
About 66 percent of customers basing these types of aircraft said they were satis-
fied or extremely satisfied. Single and multi-engine customer responses of satis-
faction were 31 percent and 39 percent, respectively. Turbo-prop and turbo-jet
operators also tended to be more satisfied with the condition of parking and stor-
age facilities than were customers operating other types of aircraft.
A clearer consensus existed among based-users in regard to parking and stor-
age facility costs. Almost 64 percent said they were dissatisfied or totally dissat-
isfied with current prices. And, unlike previous concerns, type of aircraft made
little difference in how customers responded.
Fixed Base Operators. The survey concluded by asking based-users about
FBOs. Most were satisfied with facilities and services offered by both FBOs and
all respondents disagreed that PWK needs more than two full-service FBOs.
Satisfaction With Services
There was considerably stronger consensus among based-user customers
concerning their satisfaction with services at PWK than was the case with facili-
ties. Based-users responses to questions related to fuel services, maintenance
services, flight instruction, and management were solicited by the survey.
Fuel Services. Almost 75 percent of based-users said they were satisfied
with availability and quality of ramp and fuel services. Only 26 percent were sat-
isfied with fuel prices. However, fuel costs was considerably more a point of
contention among those basing turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft at PWK. Only four
percent of turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft operators responded that they were either
satisfied or extremely satisfied with fuel prices. In contrast, almost 30 percent of
single-engine and multi-engine based-users reported satisfaction with fuel
prices.
Maintenance Services. Generally, based-users reported satisfaction with
availability (46 percent) and quality (45 percent) of maintenance services at
PWK. Again, cost was a major issue with 42 percent voicing dissatisfaction.
However, turbo-prop customers (66 percent) and turbo-jet/turbo-fan customers
(50 percent) were much more likely to be satisfied or extremely satisfied with
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maintenance services than based-user owners/operators of single-engine and
multi-engine aircraft at PWK. In total numbers of based-users only 20 percent
expressed satisfaction or extreme satisfaction with maintenance services at
PWK.
Flight Instruction. Based-user customers were largely supportive of the
availability, quality, and cost of flight instruction at PWK. About half the
respondents said they were satisfied or extremely satisfied and another 30 per-
cent report neutrality. Although it was recognized that turbo-prop and turbo-
jet/turbo-fan users reported neutrality about flight instruction, the strong satis-
faction of single-engine and multi-engine customers was clear.
Management. A series of questions were asked to see how customers felt
they were treated by management at PWK. Nearly 40 percent of based-users
believed they were valued customers. Furthermore, almost 70 percent said that
airport staff treat them with a great deal of respect. Also, 41 percent agreed they
were listened to when voicing concerns to airport staff.
Airport Utilization
Respondents were asked to state how they used PWK and other major
regional reliever airports in Northeastern Illinois. In general 41 percent reported
they flew mostly for both business and pleasure. When asked why they based
their aircraft at PWK the overwhelming response was PWKs convenient loca-
tion. Frequently mentioned was quality of facilities and services.
A vast majority of based-users (76 percent) fly 250 or less operations at PWK
annually although a few (4 percent) fly 1000 or more. Of the total number of
these based-users 58 percent thought their airport utilization will remain the
same over the next five years while 29 percent thought it would increase, and 9
percent predicted decreasing their utilization.
The survey also asked respondents to relate their use of other airports and
their reasons for doing so. Waukegan Memorial was the most frequently used by
30 percent of respondents, followed by Dupage County Airport at 17 percent.
Less than 10 percent of respondents mentioned Aurora Municipal Airport or
Lake-in-the-Hills. Based-user respondents reported utilization of one of these
locations almost four times a month on average. Based-users frequently men-
tioned better facilities, better services, less congested approach patterns, and
convenient passenger pickup as rationale for using other airports. However, the
greatest motivation for using other airports was less expensive fuel.
Changes and Improvements Desired by Based-users. After asking based-
users about their current satisfaction with services, facilities, and management
at PWK, they were asked to look ahead. Specifically, information was sought
about the future at PWK and any related changes they thought ought to be made
there. Again, close-ended questions were used that asked based-users to choose,
from a 5-point scale, how much they agreed or disagreed with statements about
changes that ought to be made at PWK. The survey was concluded with a few
open-ended questions allowing respondents to offer comments about PWK
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facilities, services, and management in their own words. It should be noted that
those responding to open-ended questions did not represent a majority of survey
respondents as a whole. Responses were provided merely to help readers gain a
feeling for the tone of responses.
Facilities. Clearly the most strongly felt need for PWKs future, among
based-users, revolves around aircraft storage facilities. A little over 50 percent
of based-users said they believed PWK needs more community and corporate
hangars. Over 75 percent saw the need for more T-hangars and individual air-
craft facilities as an integral factor to the future success of PWK. Of customers
basing turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft most, over 75 percent, strongly feel the need
for more corporate facilities. Based-user customers disagree that PWK ought to
provide more tie-downs, obtain better highway access, or place a limit on num-
bers of aircraft based at the airport.
A total of 29 based-user customers volunteered additional comments about
PWK facilities. The following quotes characterized their comments about taxi-
way conditions and runway characteristics. These quotes were typical of what
customers who choose to respond to the open-ended questions related: Need
better taxiways, Better taxiway surface conditions, Better pavement on sec-
ondary runways used as taxiways, A full length parallel taxiway for runway
16/24", and Taxiways and ramps are tight in places." These comments were not
necessarily representative of based-user customers and were largely critical.
The same was true for the following quotations regarding storage and parking
needs: Covered tie-downs and T-Hangars, New T-Hangars are BADLY
needed, More T-Hangars, and More Hangars.
Services. There was general agreement among based-users that PWK does
not need more than two full-service FBOs. Customers basing single-engine and
multi-engine aircraft were much more in agreement on this issue than were
turbo-prop and turbo-jet/turbo-fan operators. For instance, about 66 percent of
customers basing turbo-prop aircraft and 50 percent of customers basing turbo-
jet/turbo-fan aircraft agreed or strongly agreed that more FBO service was
needed. Finally there was some agreement that PWK needs to provide better
snow removal and security to protect aircraft. Customers basing turbo-jet/turbo-
fan aircraft at PWK feel more strongly about these needs.
Management. Some customers choosing to respond to the open-ended ques-
tions also commented about management. The following quotations were typi-
cal of those remarks: Management is too bureaucratic, Management needs to
LISTEN to their clients, and Management needs to be more flexible.
Desirability of Other Regional Airports. The survey asked based-user cus-
tomers about their use of other major regional airports in Northeastern Illinois
and their rationale for doing so. Generally, based-users most often mentioned
that they flew to Waukegan Memorial (30 percent), followed by Dupage County
(17 percent). However, turbo-prop and turbo-jet/turbo-fan operators most fre-
quently flew to Chicago Midway (42 and 67 percent respectively). Almost 40
percent of multi-engine operators said they flew most frequently to Dupage
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County. Customers gave numerous reasons for using these other airports includ-
ing passenger pickup, less expensive fuel, less congested air space, and better
facilities and services. Based-users utilized other airports about four times a
month on average.
The survey concluded by asking based-users to indicate whether they were
considering moving their aircraft to another regional airport. Fifty based-users
(33 percent) said they were considering relocation. Based-users operating
turbo-jet/turbo-fan aircraft were those most likely to be considering a move; 44
percent of the 25 turbo-jet/turbo-fan respondents were considering relocation
(see Figure 2 and Table 3).
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Figure 2. Based-users considering relocation.
Table 3
Based-users Considering Relocation (by type of aircraft)
Number of Number of Respondents Percentage of Respondents
Type of Aircraft Respondents Considering Relocation Considering Relocation
Single-engine 93 28 30
Multi-engine 32 11 35
Turbo-prop 0 0 0
Turbo-jet/Turbo-fan 25 11 44
Total 150 50 33
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The survey asked those who were considering a move to explain in their own
words why they were considering relocation. The following quotes were charac-
teristic of their reasons: Lower fuel costs, Better maintenance prices, fuel
costs, Hangar facilities, Better hangars at lower cost", and Less expensive
fuel and tie-down costs.
TRANSIENT-USER SURVEY RESULTS
Like the based-user survey instrument, the transient-user survey instrument
was designed to gauge customer satisfaction with facilities, services, and man-
agement at PWK. In this instrument questions were specifically crafted to assess
transient-user satisfaction with airport facilities and FBO services, as well as to
generally learn how transients utilize PWK.
Facilities, Services, and Management. Similar to based-user operators at
PWK, satisfaction of transient-user customers with availability, condition, or
cost of PWK facilities and services varied. What did stand out was that neutrality
was the answer most often given. For instance, transient-users lacked conviction
one way or another about PWKs prices for fuel, parking, and storage. The
majority of responses regarding PWKs facilities and services, on balance, were
more positive than negative. For instance, 43 percent of transient-users said they
were either satisfied or extremely satisfied with length of runways. Almost 35
percent responded the same about width of runways. Transient-users also indi-
cated that they were satisfied with Air Traffic Control (ATC) services and snow
removal.
In contrast to the mostly positive responses by transient-users, airport pave-
ment conditions and availability of parallel taxiways stood out as notable excep-
tions. Transient-users reported dissatisfaction with pavement conditions (42
percent) and dissatisfaction or extreme dissatisfaction with parallel taxiway
availability (47 percent).
Transient-user satisfaction with FBOs facilities, services, and management
was overwhelmingly positive. Over 70 percent of transient-users said they were
satisfied, or extremely satisfied, with the quality and courtesy of FBOs serv-
ices. Practically all transient-users responding to the survey said they would use
the same FBO next time they flew into PWK.
Airport Utilization. The study identifies aircraft type and total number of
aircraft operated by transient-users applying the same categories as the based-
user survey. The 121 transient-user respondents flew a total of 307 operations
per month into PWK (see Table 4). In contrast to based-users, the greatest per-
centage of transient-users flew mostly for business, followed by business and
pleasure, and lastly pleasure alone.
A little more than half of the respondents said they conduct 25 or fewer
annual operations while 16 percent said they conduct over 50 operations per
year. About 68 percent said they expected to use PWK about as much over the
next five years as they had this year. Another 25 percent said their utilization will
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increase, and less than 8 percent indicated a decrease in their utilization in the
future.
CONCLUSION
Overall, conducting a customer satisfaction survey such as the one done for
the PMAC is helpful in providing customer based input to the airport operator
about a number of issues including:
1. Future capital investment needs,
2. Current airfield operational concerns,
3. Fuel costs,
4. Aircraft storage costs, and
5. Maintenance requirements.
Based on analysis of 160 based-user responses and 121 transient-user
responses, customer satisfaction with Palwaukee Airport can be described as
follows.
Based-users
Generally, based-users were most likely to express satisfaction about ATC
services; length of runways, availability, quality, and cost of flight instruction;
airport accessibility; availability of fuel; quality of ramp service; availability
and quality of maintenance; and FBOs customer service.
Most were likely to express dissatisfaction regarding costs of aircraft park-
ing/storage; costs of maintenance, parts, and services; costs of aviation fuel;
availability of hangars of all types; capacity for additional based-users; and
security of aircraft.
Evaluation of data gathered from 50 based-users considering relocation cate-
gorized by aircraft type enables PMAC to focus on individual user-needs.
Single-engine operators considering relocation expressed concern over matters
of costs, availability, and condition of parking/storage; the availability of han-
gars of all types; the cost of maintenance, parts and service; and security of air-
craft. Multi-engine operators considering relocation expressed concern over
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Table 4
Transient-user Operations at PWK (by Type of Aircraft)
Type of Aircraft Operations per Month
Single-engine 103
Multi-engine 68
Turbo-prop 34
Turbo-jet & Turbo-fan 97
Rotorcraft 5
Total 307
matters of cost and availability of parking/storage; availability of hangars of all
types; costs of aviation fuel; costs of maintenance, parts, and service; and secu-
rity of aircraft.
There were no turbo-prop operators considering relocation. And finally,
turbo-jet/turbo-fan operators considering relocation expressed concern over
costs, availability, and condition of parking/storage; availability of commu-
nity/corporate hangars; availability of taxiways suitable to aircraft operated;
costs of fuel; snow removal; and security of aircraft.
Among those operators not considering relocation, single-engine operators
expressed concern over costs of parking/storage, availability of T-hangars, and
security of aircraft. Multi-engine operators not considering relocation were dis-
satisfied with costs of parking/storage and availability of hangars of all types.
Turbo-prop operators, none of which indicated they were considering reloca-
tion, expressed concerns related to costs of parking/storage and numbers of full-
service FBOs. Turbo-jet/turbo-fan operators not considering relocation were
concerned with length of runways; availability of community/corporate han-
gars; costs of aviation fuel; and security.
Transient-users
The transient-user survey was constructed so as to provide data for PMAC to
evaluate customer satisfaction by aircraft type. Those transient-users respond-
ing were most likely to express satisfaction with the quality of FBOs services,
facilities, and ATC services. They were most likely to express dissatisfaction
with the condition of airport pavements, availability of parallel taxiways, and
costs of aviation fuel obtained from FBOs.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Costs for storage and parking facilities was the major issue. It became clear in
many situations that aircraft operators were concerned with the availability of
hangar space. Investigators found that costs and availability of hangars was the
primary reason that 33 percent of PWKs based-users were considering reloca-
tion.
Investigators recommend that PMAC determine the cost of comparable
parking, storage, and hangar facilities at other airports and competitively adjust
costs at PWK. Also, PMAC should study the feasibility of building more hangar
facilities and find out the type most needed (i.e., T-hangar, corporate, etc.) based
upon requirements of based-users considering relocation. An additional recom-
mendation is that a forecast of future parking, storage, and hangar requirements
be developed in the interest of attracting additional based-users.
Survey results indicated that customers at PWK were generally satisfied with
the availability of FBOs services, but costs related to fuel and maintenance
were a concern. Investigators recommend that PMAC undertake a study of fuel
and maintenance costs at the other airports in the Northeastern Illinois region
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and determine how adjustments could make PWK more competitive and help
increase user satisfaction.
With the impact of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 not fully
being realized at this time the investigators further recommend that this study be
expanded to include a random sample of reliever airports nationally. If what was
found at PWK holds true for other relievers, in terms of the need for capital
improvements (runways, taxiways, ramps as specified by AIP) there may be a
better argument made for additional funding of reliever airport needs nation-
wide.
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APPENDIX A
Based Aircraft User Survey Questions
1. How many of each type of aircraft do you base at PWK?
Type Number
Single Engine Piston 120
Multi Engine Piston 34
Turbo prop 8
Turbo jet/turbo fan 46
Rotor craft 3
Other (please specify) 0
2. How do you use your aircraft (Check one)?
32.3% Mostly Business
40.5% Mostly Pleasure
27.2% Business and Pleasure
3. Why did you choose to base your aircraft at PWK (please rank with 1 being
the most important and 4 least important consideration)?
(raw scores) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1. Convenient location of PWK 69% 1% 1% 1%
2. Quality of PWK facilities 1% 21% 22% 6%
3. Quality of PWK services 1% 17% 22% 11%
4. Other, specify 1% 6% 1% 8%
4. How many annual operations (counting take-offs and landings separately)
do you conduct at PWK?
38% 1 to 100 15% 251 to 500 1% 1001 to 2500
38% 101 to 250 4% 501 to 1000 3% 2501 or more
5. How many flight hours do you conduct per year in the aircraft you base at
PWK (per aircraft)?
Mean = 278; Median = 150.
64 Journal of Air Transportation World Wide
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol 3 No 2 1998 Page
6. a. Estimate how many gallons of fuel you purchase annually at Palwau-
kee?
Mean = 16,475; Median = 1,200.
b. How many gallons of fuel a year do you purchase at other local airports?
Mean = 7,960; Median = 500.
7. Are you expecting your use of PWK over the next five years to (check one):
Increase 29% Decrease 9% Stay the same 58%
Next, we would like to begin by asking you to tell us how satisfied you are with
PWK facilities and services.
8. Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is totally dissatisfied and 5 is
extremely satisfied) how satisfied you are with the:
(Modal Choice Italicized) 1 2 3 4 5
Length of runways 7.6 14.0 22.3 20.4 35.7
Width of runways 12.8 17.9 25.0 17.9 26.3
Availability of parallel taxiways 11.0 20.8 32.5 20.1 15.6
Condition of aviation pavements 18.5 17.2 29.3 25.5 9.6
FAA ATC services 5.2 7.1 14.9 39.0 33.8
Availability of aircraft
parking/storage 23.0 21.1 17.1 19.7 19.1
Condition of aircraft
parking/storage 19.9 14.7 29.5 19.9 16.0
Cost of aircraft parking/storage 37.0 26.6 18.2 11.7 6.5
Availability of flight
instruction services 7.8 7.8 30.0 26.7 27.8
Quality of flight
instruction services 5.7 8.0 30.7 28.4 27.3
Cost of flight instruction services 9.4 14.1 38.8 25.9 10.6
Pilot lounges 9.4 11.8 33.9 27.6 17.3
Airport restaurants 9.2 12.8 36.2 34.0 7.8
Lodging, Personal
Security, & Safety 10.8 10.8 28.0 30.1 20.4
Airport accessibility by air 5.3 11.2 23.7 30.9 28.9
Airport accessibility by land 4.6 5.9 21.1 38.8 29.6
Fuel Availability 6.0 6.7 13.3 28.7 45.3
Quality of Ramp and Fuel Service 4.1 11.5 16.2 32.4 35.8
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Continued  (Modal Choice Italicized) 1 2 3 4 5
Cost of fuel 26.8 19.7 27.4 15.9 10.2
Availability of Aircraft
Maintenance & Parts Service 6.8 11.5 35.8 29.7 16.2
Quality of Aircraft Maintenance
& Parts Service 10.3 13.8 31.0 31.7 13.1
Cost of Aircraft Maintenance &
Parts Service 22.6 19.2 34.9 15.8 7.5
9. We want to know if you are satisfied with the business and administrative
practices at PWK. Please respond to the following statements (SD indicates
you strongly disagree, D disagree, N no opinion, A agree and SA strongly
agree).
(Modal Choice Italicized) SD D N A SA
I am valued as a customer
at Palwaukee 12.7 22.2 25.9 35.4 3.8
Airport staff treats me with respect 3.8 8.9 17.8 58.0 11.5
Airport staff shares my concerns
about issues that I have brought
to their attention 13.0 13.6 32.5 36.4 4.5
We are very interested in finding out what changes you think ought to be made in
PWK airport facilities and services in the upcoming years.
10. Please respond to the following statements (SD indicates you strongly dis-
agree, D disagree, N no opinion, A agree and SA strongly agree).
(Modal Choice Italicized) SD D N A SA
PWK needs more community/
corporate hangars 1.3 7.8 35.7 33.8 21.4
PWK needs more T-hangars
and/or single aircraft storage 1.3 5.1 17.9 28.8 46.8
PWK needs more than two
full-service FBOs 12.2 26.9 21.8 18.6 20.5
PWK needs more tiedowns 3.3 19.0 48.4 19.6 9.8
PWK should place a limit on the
number of based aircraft 44.3 31.0 18.4 5.7 0.6
PWK needs highway access 11.0 43.5 26.6 13.0 5.8
PWK needs better snow removal 5.3 28.3 26.3 31.6 8.6
PWK needs to provide better security
measures to protect aircraft 1.3 21.4 20.8 39.0 17.5
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11. What, if any, airport facilities and/or services do you think need improve-
ment at PWK (use additional sheets as necessary)?
Finally, we would also like to ask you about your use of other airports.
12. Other than PWK, which airport in Northeastern Illinois do you use most
often (check one):
4.5% Aurora Municipal Airport 16.9% DuPage County
8.4% Campbell Airport 8.4% Lake-in-the-Hills
9.1% Chicago Midway 29.9% Waukegan Memorial
Other (Please specify) 22.7% Kenosha
13. Please rank the following reasons for using this other facility (where 1 is the
most important reason, 2 the second most important, and so on).
(raw scores) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
Better facilities 15 13 4 5 3 1
Better Services 14 15 5 4 5 1
Ground facilities less crowded 2 9 10 9 9 0
Air approach less congested 15 7 6 5 6 2
Fuel is less expensive 21 12 9 4 2 4
Passenger Pickup 10 10 4 3 8 1
Other (please specify) 5 3 1 0 0 0
14. How frequently do you use this other airport (times per month)?
Mean = 3.7; Median = 0
15. Are you actively considering moving your aircraft to another area facility?
Yes 32.3% No 67.7%
15a. If considering a move, which airport are you planning to move to?
15b. Please tell us why you are considering this other airport:
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APPENDIX B
Transient Aircraft User Survey Questions
We would like to find out more about your use of PWK.
1. How many of each type of aircraft do you operate?
Type Number
Single-Engine Piston 103
Multi-Engine Piston 68
Turbo-prop 34
Turbo-jet/turbo fan 97
Rotorcraft 5
Other (please specify) 0
2. How do you use your aircraft (Check one)?
75.2% Mostly Business
11.1% Mostly Pleasure
13.7% Business and Pleasure
3. Why did you choose to use PWK (please rank with 1 being the most impor-
tant and 4 least important consideration)?
(raw scores) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
1. Convenient location of PWK 68% 2% 0% 0%
2. Quality of PWK facilities 2% 16% 31% 6%
3. Quality of PWK services 2% 33% 18% 3%
4. Other, specify 4% 6% 9% 7%
4. How many annual operations (counting take-offs and landings separately)
do you conduct at PWK?
55.8% 1 to 25
28.3% 26 to 50
15.8% 51 or more
5. a. Estimate how many gallons of fuel you purchase annually at Palwau-
kee?
Mean = 5041; Median = 525.
b. How many gallons of fuel a year do you purchase at other elsewhere?
Mean = 69,658; Median = 8050.
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6. Are you expecting your use of PWK over the next five years to (check one):
Increase 25.0% Decrease 7.5% Stay the same 67.5%
7. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 1 is totally dissatisfied, 3 is neutral, and 5 is
extremely satisfied) how satisfied are you with the:
(Modal Choice Italicized) 1 2 3 4 5
Length of runways 12.6 18.5 26.1 22.7 20.2
Width of runways 16.8 21.8 26.9 21.8 12.6
Availability of parallel taxiways 19.7 27.4 30.8 15.4 6.8
Condition of aviation pavements 13.4 28.6 40.3 13.4 4.2
FAA ATC services 4.2 13.4 30.3 40.3 11.8
Snow Removal 0.0 11.9 47.5 29.7 10.9
Cost of FBO Fuel 8.5 24.6 44.1 19.5 3.4
Quality of FBO lounge facilities 5.9 11.0 31.4 39.8 11.9
Quality of FBO pilot briefing facilities 2.6 9.5 38.8 39.7 9.5
Quality of FBO restroom facilities 3.4 6.8 39.8 36.4 13.6
Quality of catering services 2.2 5.5 51.6 34.1 6.6
Availability of transient aircraft
parking/storage 11.4 21.9 33.3 29.8 3.5
Condition of aircraft
parking/storage 13.7 20.5 37.6 24.8 3.4
Cost of aircraft
parking/storage facilities 11.1 18.8 49.6 16.2 4.3
Ease of access to aircraft
parking/storage facilities 11.2 20.7 33.6 29.3 5.2
Quality of FBO service 2.6 6.0 20.5 46.2 24.8
Courtesy of FBO service 4.3 6.9 9.5 38.8 40.5
8. What changes, if any, would you like to see made in FBO services at PWK?
9. When you return to PWK, will you consider using the same FBO as last
time?
Yes 97.5% No 2.5%
If not, why not?
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USING TQM AND ISO 9000 PRINCIPLES
IN ASSURING EDUCATION
SERVICE QUALITY
Igor Kabashkin
Boris Michnev
and
Georgy Utehin
Riga Aviation University, Latvia
ABSTRACT
This paper describesRigaAviationUniversitysmovement froma strongly regulated and controlled
professional education program to a system of contract relationswith students as Education Service
customers. This period demanded, first, a study of students demands, requirements and issues, and
the development of interrelation methods based on Total Quality Management, and, second, the
building of a University Quality Assurance System according to ISO 9000 standards.1, 2
INTRODUCTION
Today two main factors determine the quality of aviation graduates in Riga
Aviation University (RAU): governmental accreditation of academic study pro-
grams (B.Sc., M.Sc.), and individual certification of the aviation graduates by
the Latvian Civil Aviation Administration. Competition in the Education Serv-
ice (ES) market is one of the new objectives for the University in the modern
market economy. To address this challenge, RAU is developing an internal Uni-
versity quality management system based on Total Quality Management (TQM)
principles and ISO 9000 standards. There are two main stages of this process: a
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol 3 No 2 1998 Page
Journal of Air Transportation World Wide Vol. 3, No. 2  1998
IgorKabashkin is a Professor andHead of theAviationMaintenanceDepartment andViceRector of
Riga Aviation University. He received his Doctor Habilitus Degree in Engineering from Riga
Aviation University and Latvian Academy of Science in 1993. He has published 217 scientific
papers, 19 scientific and teaching books, and holds 67 patents and certificates of invention.
Boris Michnev is an Associate Professor at Riga Aviation University in the Computer Science
Department. He holds a Doctor of Engineering Science degree with interests in computer science,
automation control, and information technologies.He has publishedmore than 50 science, teaching,
and methodological papers and holds 2 invention patents.
Georgy Utehin is an Associate Professor at Riga Aviation University in the Aviation Maintenance
Department. He received his doctoral degree in engineering in 1993. He has published 32 scientific
papers, 3 standards of civil aviation meteorological assessment, and 5 study manuals.
©1998, Aviation Institute, University of Nebraska at Omaha
study of ES customers requirements and the development of an ES Quality
Assurance System.
STUDY OF ES CUSTOMERS DEMANDS,
REQUIREMENTS AND ISSUES
Research Purposes
The present research was oriented on the following purposes:
Develop a list of the characteristics of ES customers,
Develop a list of the specialties and accreditation needs of ES customers,
Define a set of ES quality guarantees acceptable to the ES customers, and
Establish quality guarantees to address the concerns of ES customers.
At first a model of Education Services at RAU was designed. The model had two
levels: service preparation and service supply. The first level consisted of the
following activities:
Establish new specialty offeringsincluding creating specialty status
and qualification criteria,
Estimate demands and resources,
Develop study programs and quality plan,
Prepare staff,
Advertise,
Prepare methodological base, and
Prepare library and laboratory.
The second level consisted of the following activities:
Implement application process and conduct entrance examinations,
Register students and distribute information about RAU regulations,
Assign schedules,
Conduct classes, laboratories and practices,
Assure security,
Complete the reporting, consultation, and testing processes,
Perform a qualifications check, and
Award diplomas.
Problem Investigation Method
The data for the present research was obtained through student surveys, indi-
vidual interviews with applications, and meetings and discussions with students
and secondary school graduates. The data were categorized by topic and
grouped into whether related to ES customer demands or concerns. The data
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were then summarized and used to develop the RAU Quality Assurance System.
Findings
The needs of the ES customers fall into four categories.
Opportunity to get a job includes diploma recognition by employers (in
Latvia and abroad).
Period of studyincludes a desire for short-term programs of study.
Information about specialtyincludes attractiveness of profession based
on the job market and expected salaries. Currently, accounting and
computer specialties are considered attractive and science, rare and new
specialties are not. Overall, those pursuing aviation specialties have
low prospects considering the lack of development in the Latvian avia-
tion industry.
Degree of subject complexityincludes the desire for simple programs of
study.
The concerns of ES customers fall into four categories:
Insufficient and untrustworthy information about the specialty,
Insufficient information about university accreditation,
Unreliability in continuation of specialty offerings, and
Lack of guarantees of employment opportunities. Unfortunately, most of
these concerns are related to the current difficult social-economic con-
ditions of Latvia.
Implications of Research Findings
The summarized data lead to the following conclusions:
It is necessary to establish a permanent university marketing research
plan. The research must include information on the current and pro-
spective employment trends in Latvia. The results of this market
research must be disseminated and incorporated into ES customer
recruitment materials.
Guarantees must be formulated as a RAU Quality Policy approved by the
Rector and incorporated into the agreements between the University
and ES customers. These guarantees must include (1) confirmation of
accreditation of the university, the specialty and the diploma, (2) assur-
ance that accurate information has been provided to the ES customer,
and (3) the conditions of University liability.
Documentation of the Quality Assurance System must be developed to
assure consistent and complete implementation and to prevent ES cus-
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tomer claims. This documentation system should have four levels:
RAU Policy regarding ES Quality Assurance,
Quality Assurance Manual (i.e. instructions on ES quality controls),
Quality Assurance Handbooks for teaching and support personnel,
including standard contracts and work instructions, and
Incorporation of ES Quality Assurance policy into curriculums, study
plans and programs, educational standards, qualifications criteria,
quality plans, reviews, remarks, etc.
ES QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Development Goals
There are two development goals of the ES Quality Assurance System: ES
customers and University executives will be confident that (1) educational serv-
ices are implemented according to stated requirements, and (2) educational
services will be accredited by the appropriate governmental and international
agencies according to stated requirements.
Development Tasks
The tasks necessary to meet the development goals include the following
activities:
Develop and regulate ES specification, service supplement processes
specifications and ES Quality Assurance control methods specifica-
tions,
Build ES process structure including ES design and supplement (see
Research Purposes section),
Adapt Quality Assurance System according to ISO 9001 (see Table 1),
Define University Quality Assurance System scales and structurequal-
ity assurance systems must cover all life circles of ES and include teach-
ing and support services activities (e.g. administrative support, library
services, etc.),
Develop ES inspection plans for different stages including testing proper-
ties, methods, testing tools, responsible personnel, data registration
forms, etc.,
Develop methodological instructions for Quality Assurance System regu-
lation procedures and use to create RAU Quality Assurance Manual,
Develop job descriptions for personnel responsible for Quality Assurance
System,
Educate and train University personnel in the implementation of the ES
Quality Assurance system procedures, including those of internal
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audits at the faculty, specialty, department and university levels, and
Create University Quality Assurance Management Service which will
organize the collection and analyses of all ES Quality Assurance related
information.
RAUS QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM
Table 1 details RAUs Quality Assurance System procedures in terms of the
corresponding ISO 9001 Procedures.
Table 1
RAUs Quality Assurance System Procedures, in terms of ISO 9001 Procedures
ISO 9001 Procedures Corresponding ES Quality Assurance System Procedures
1. Managements Commitment EstablishAdministrations responsibility to students and per-
sonnel to assure ES Quality
2. Quality System Establish ES Quality Assurance System documentation
structure and guidelines and ES Quality Assurance manage-
ment planning
3. Contract Review Estimate Universitys capacity to run a specific specialty and
establish contingency plan with ES customers in case of
changes in contract conditions
4. Design and Development Develop specialty qualification criteria, curricula and subject
programs
5. Control of Documents Entrust Document Management Service to administration
6. Purchasing Establish relationswith subcontractorswhichwill provideES
supplies and purchase literature, computer and laboratory
equipment
7. Control of Customer
Supplied Product
Maintain confidentiality of ES customer documentation and
records
8. Product and Traceability
Identification
Design ES customer registration and attendance documents
(IDs, attendance journals, etc.) to document jobs performed,
chairs reports and ES customer reports
9. Process Control Establish ES quality testing and controls and reporting
requirements (to deans office and chairsworkorganization)
10. Testing and Inspection Establish ES Quality objectives, means and testing methods
11. Controls of Testing
Equipment
Develop, test, improve and maintain documentation of ES
Quality testing, including examiners tickets, tests and pro-
grams used
12. Inspection and Test Status Establish diploma awarding procedures and diploma status
13. Control of Noncomforming
Product
Establish means of detecting activity by Executives and
mandatemeansof reportingbyofficials in the case of discrep-
ancies between designed and supplied ES
14. Corrective and Preventive
Action
Establishmethod to prevent appearance of predicted noncon-
formaties and to prevent the reappearance of previously dis-
covered noncomformaties
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15. Delivery Not actual
16. Control of Quality Records Establish rules of ES Quality management recording, includ-
ing ES customers books, examination records, certificates,
diplomas, and commissions acts
17. Internal Quality Audits Establish Quality Audit System and a separate procedure for
Self-Assessment Activity Management
18. Personnel Training Teach staff the skills necessary for upgrading the system
19. Technical Servicing Not actual
20. Statistics Techniques Establish statistical methods to be used for determining
important trends in the teaching processes quality
HIGHER EDUCATION QUALITY ASSURANCE REVIEW
Riga Aviation Universitys Quality System is based on published results of
the experiences of other leading European Universities with Higher Education
Quality Assurance.4,5 For example, the University of Wolverhampton became
the first university to achieve ISO 9001 registration for its Quality Management
System. As a result, both academic and support staff became more sophisticated
about TQM concepts such as customer orientation, internal and external client
chains, and customer satisfaction. The Lancaster Universitys experience also
showed TQMs acceptability for use in higher education institutions. They use
objectives of TQM in their operations and in response to external quality assess-
ment and audit. Publications of the universitys experiences mentioned above
emphasize the following Demings principles of TQM:3
Maintain constancy of purposes and attention to the process,
Make the supplier a partner,
Make the employer a partner,
Vigorously institute training, education and self-improvement, and
Emphasize leadership of management and teamwork of employees.
QUALITY OF POSTGRADUATE AVIATION TRAINING
Riga Aviation University has good training facilities to provide professional
postgraduate education. The teaching activity has a few special features and was
historically customer oriented. Our approach is that any customer is the focal
point and that he or she should critically assess whether the quality criteria
agreed upon with the supplier has been met. When referring to the quality crite-
ria or the views of the customer, several quality elements must be considered.
The most important quality criteria are the achievements of the training
objectives in any programs. This must also be completed within the scheduled
time frame as agreed upon (see procedure 4).
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Once a training schedule has been established with the customer it shall not
be changed (see procedure 3).
Personnel shall have a high degree of competence to assist the customer in
defining the training objectives and methods used to achieve the customers
goals (see procedure 18).
The documentation delivered by the training organization to the trainees, as
well as to the contractual partners, shall be error-free and up-to-date (see proce-
dure 12).
The training facilities shall have a modern, good and clean appearance, both
inside and out. Access to the latest technology, which is taught, shall also be
given (see procedures 4 and 6).
The instructors shall be competent, qualified and shall apply effective meth-
ods and up-to-date media (see procedures 9 and 18).
The core business of a training center is the performance of courses. Well-
qualified instructors will apply the most appropriate methods and media to
transfer knowledge, skills and attitudes (see procedure 9).
Assessment and testing are done to verify that the specified training objec-
tives are met. Different methods must be proven before being considered (see
procedures 10 and 17).
This postgraduate professional education must participate in RAUs Quality
Assurance System.
CONCLUSION
To strengthen its position in modern conditions the RAU must build capacity
in the following TQM principles.
University administration must take a leading role in supporting quality
improvement.
University management must take responsibility for ES Quality support
to customers.
Personnel must cooperate with ES customers to prevent misunderstand-
ings and assure quality improvement.
Quality improvement must be based on the requirements, specifications
and demands of the ES customers.
A systems approach to quality management must include all aspects of ES
design and implementation with special attention to the processes.
Personnel skills must be continually upgraded.
A quality assurance system built in accordance to ISO 9001 Standards and
with personnel being responsible for ES Quality may be the base for introducing
TQM principles at Riga Aviation University.
For all the processes mentioned above, flight and maintenance training
organizations have to develop ideas and concepts about how an innovative qual-
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ity management system can be developed. The focus must be on how a success-
ful organization can be established. There are three major elements that need to
be considered in order to achieve this objective.
First, establish a Management Committee. It is necessary to demonstrate to
the entire staff that quality management is part of the University identity. To
demonstration this commitment, the management must be aware of the entre-
preneurial meaning of quality management. They should explain the term qual-
ity to the University staff and determine the quality requirements for the
intangible product. Furthermore, they have to understand quality documenta-
tion requirements and the relation of the quality cost elements to each other.
Second, management has to provide guidelines for the entrepreneurial
processes and conduct process analyses. The individual process owner has to
know the elements of process management and how to implement the processes.
All staff should be aware of the required documentation, and provisions must be
available to provide for their maintenance.
Third, an independent quality manager has to establish an Audit System and
apply different audit procedures to provide feedback about the training organi-
zations ability to carry out training and examinations which meet the standards
of the top management. The independent quality management has to be able to
conduct system, procedural, product and service audits.
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AN OUTLOOK AT THE FUTURE OF THE
AIRLINE AVIONICS INDUSTRY
Richard Charles
and
Atef Ghobrial
Georgia State University
ABSTRACT
The aviation industry is slowly but surely changing its character. As airlines restructure, what they
ask of, and how they relate to their suppliers (including avionicsmanufacturers)will greatly change
aswell. The avionics industry is currently facingmany challenges as a result of the reluctance of air-
lines to invest in new technologies and the possibility that airframemanufacturerswill take over this
industry. This paper analyzes the changes and performance of the avionics industry. It provides an
overview of the evolution of avionics technologies and explores the impact of airline deregulation
on the avionics industry. It also provides a perspective on the future outlook of the industry with
implications to marketing strategies of avionics manufacturers.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Despite substantial research assessing the effects of deregulation on airline
market structure and performance, little has been done to measure similar
impacts on the avionics industry. The commercial air transport avionics industry
is changing with simultaneous effects of advanced technology and airline
deregulation causing shifts in airline priorities for avionics equipment.
The term avionics is derived from AVIation electrONICS. It describes an
increasingly broad spectrum of aircraft equipment and functions. Avionics
refers to aircraft electronic equipment that serves the primary functions of com-
munications, navigation and automatic flight control. Many aircraft functions
that were performed in the past by mechanical, hydraulic or electrical systems
now are conducted as electronic systems. Aircraft electronic systems are those
characterized by relatively small operating voltages, small current levels, and
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typically solid-state circuitry. Aircraft electrical systems are characterized by
high voltages and current levels, such as those associated with primary electrical
power systems. Once an aircraft system becomes electronic, it is often regarded
as an avionics system.
Following World War II, the U.S. airline industry blossomed, carrying pas-
sengers, freight and mail. In the mid-1940s, the Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
(ARINC) (a not-for-profit corporation owned by airlines) was created.1 ARINC
committees and sub-committees were formed by airline personnel and ARINC
dministrative support staff to develop technical standards for the avionics
industry.2 Because commercial airframe business was dominated by the United
States, ARINC standards also were applied equally to foreign airlines.
From the 1940s to the mid-1980s the avionics industry was dominated almost
totally by two U.S. firms, Collins Avionics and Bendix Avionics, which sup-
plied complete lines of communication and navigation equipment to virtually all
the worlds airlines.3 Foreign avionics firms, mostly in Western Europe,
addressed primarily the avionics needs of their militaries.4 Other U.S. firms
served niches in the commercial marketplace. Formation of the Airbus consor-
tium in Europe led ultimately to entry of European avionics firms into the com-
mercial market (beginning with the introduction of the A300B in 1972. By the
mid-1980s, European avionics firms began to make their first advances into the
U.S. commercial avionics market. These attempts were, however, met with lim-
ited success.
EVOLUTION OF THE AVIONICS TECHNOLOGY
Technological advances in commercial aviation from the late 1940s to the
late 1960s focused almost exclusively on airframes (aerodynamics, structures
and materials), and propulsion (the transition from propeller to jet thrust and fuel
efficiency). The period from the late 1960s to the late 1970s witnessed signifi-
cant developments in the avionics field. Research and development costs were
high, while the size of the market remained relatively unchanged. The selling
price of avionics systems multiplied. Prices were camouflaged by the significant
economies brought to airlines by phenomenal advancements in airframe and
propulsion technology. In addition, the pricing policies of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) allowed airlines to set up airfares to recover the costs of acquiring
these sophisticated systems.5
The period from the late 1970s to the present has seen the introduction of a
truly astounding level of avionics technology. Flight management systems con-
tain entire flight plans in software, along with airplane configuration and per-
formance databases. Flight plan progress and information is displayed
graphically and in real-time on CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) and LCD (Liquid
Crystal Display) display systems. Primary flight instrument display systems
integrate numerous flight and air data instrument indications on a single display.
Distance measuring equipment (DMEs), which previously displayed a simple
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slant-range to a selected ground station, now can scan multiple stations, select
optimum stations on the basis of positional geometry and signal quality, and
supply the resultant data to the flight management system for navigational sup-
port.
Weather radar systems, which in the past only displayed areas of detectable
precipitation, now can annunciate several levels of precipitation (digitally cali-
brated to more than 300 NM), display turbulence in precipitation and automati-
cally eliminate ground clutter from the display. Windshear detection systems
annunciate the presence of low-level atmospheric windshear. Autopilot systems
routinely perform fully automatic climb, enroute, descent, landing and rollout
operations. Collision avoidance systems display surrounding aircraft, calculate,
predict and annunciate conflicting flight paths. Satellite-based communication
and navigation systems provide worldwide data link and telephone quality voice
contact, and highly accurate four-dimensional position data. On-board mainte-
nance computer systems continually diagnose the condition of networked avi-
onics, identify faults and downlink maintenance requirements to the destination
station.6
Advances in avionics have brought significant improvements in safety to air-
line operations. Flight management systems have reduced pilot workload,
allowing for improved alertness and concentration in handling abnormal proce-
dures. Integrated display systems have reduced the instrument scan. New
weather radar features have made it possible for flight crews to avoid
precipitation-related turbulence and to interpret the radar display more accu-
rately. Autoland systems allow airplanes to land in poor visibility with far
greater accuracy and reliability than is possible with human control. Collision
avoidance and windshear detection systems have successfully addressed two of
the leading and most insidious hazards in aviation.
Among the most significant contributions to airline economics brought about
by modern avionics is elimination of the third flightcrew member (the flight
engineer. This was possible as a result of automated data acquisition and display
systems such as the B767s engine indicating and crew alerting system
(EICAS). Improved fuel economy also was possible due to, in conjunction with
improved airframe designs, introduction of electronic engine controls (EEC)
and the full authority digital engine control (FADEC) system. Working in com-
bination with advanced aerodynamics and engine design, precise engine control
made available by avionics EEC systems has resulted in substantially improved
engine reliability and specific fuel consumption (SFC). As a result, some mod-
ern airplanes can move the same number of passengers over comparable flight
profiles for less than half the fuel required by earlier models. Automatic mainte-
nance downlinks have made significant improvements to airline on-time operat-
ing performance.
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AIRLINE DEREGULATION AND THE AVIONICS INDUSTRY
Over the past few decades, avionics manufacturers and airframe manufactur-
ers have worked hand-in-hand from one airplane project to the next. Some prod-
ucts grew from military research and development (R&D) as technologies were
declassified. When airframe manufacturers announced the cost of a new air-
plane, airlines simply lined up to pay the price. This was possible in a regulated
environment.
Following airline deregulation in 1978, the U.S. domestic airline industry has
witnessed much more drastic changes than could have been predicted by ana-
lysts. Deregulation resulted in concentration of the airline industry into a small
number of large carriers operating under cost-control pressures. Smaller carriers
survived only when they followed the most efficient and low-cost operating
measures. In this radically new environment, airlines had to lower their costs to
be competitive. This operating philosophy has been the cornerstone of many
strategic decisions on reducing manpower, negotiating new labor contracts and
outsourcing many functions to outside contractors. Costs associated with air-
plane acquisition and operations also had to be reduced. Many avionics manu-
facturers had to reorient their thinking from being technology-driven to market-
driven. The new marketing strategy was to focus on essential avionics functions
to reduce the costs to the users.7
The following example demonstrates how the new cost-cutting philosophy
of airlines has affected the avionics industry. The development of satellite com-
munications (SATCOM) systems is expected to make available to passengers
such services as oceanic telephones, fax machines, computer modem hook-ups,
television and others. Despite the many years spent in developing these systems,
they are now being met with caution from airlines reluctant to incur their sub-
stantial cost (about $500,000 per shipset).8
Another example is Boeings attempt to introduce an electronic library sys-
tem on the new B777 airplane. The system would provide hyper-linked graphi-
cal presentations of aircraft maintenance manuals, diagnostic procedures,
wiring diagrams, minimum equipment lists and instrument approach charts, and
memory to operate advanced graphical cabin entertainment systems as well as a
host of additional features and benefits. Because of the high cost of the system
(some $1 million per shipset), it is not likely to be installed on any aircraft soon.9
Finally, the ultimate technical advance for low-visibility approach operations
(enhanced or synthetic vision systems for operations at runways not certificated
for Category III operations (remain completely outside airlines budgets and
financial plans. Systems of this type would make diversions virtually obsolete,
while saving billions of dollars in airport infrastructure improvements. Yet, air-
lines have demonstrated very little interest in these systems because of their pro-
hibitive costs.
Throughout the early 1990s, airlines pushed back deliveries of most new air-
planes on order, and canceled others.10 Avionics manufacturers, who often rely
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on sales related directly to purchase of new airframes for as much as 80 percent
of their business, have experienced serious economic downturns as a result of
delayed deliveries. Airlines also have begun delaying the purchase of capital
items not required for basic operations, and have set new standards for selection
of aircraft equipment, including avionics. It appears that airlines will invest in
avionics equipment only if it will help fly passengers more safely, faster, on
time, and, at the same time, is cost-effective.
On the other hand, the cost-cutting strategies of airlines can offer some new
opportunities for avionics manufacturers to provide maintenance service.
Assuming an airline elects to maintain B767 avionics systems (for example, up
to twenty airplanes), an additional investment of $2 million is required for test
equipment, $3 million for a service parts inventory and additional funds are
needed for training technical personnel.11 Given the high reliability of modern
avionics equipment expressed in mean time between failures (MTBF), it appears
more advantageous for airlines to contract this service to avionics suppliers.
Amortization of high capital costs associated with acquisition of test equipment
and parts is poor. And, airline technicians are generally unable to maintain tech-
nical competency on units they see only rarely; so the costs of training increase
while the productivity that results from good training remains low.
THE CHANGING MARKET STRUCTURE OF
THE AVIONICS INDUSTRY
Just as profit-starved airlines sought shelter through a strategy of buy-outs
and mergers, avionics manufacturers, who have found themselves without ade-
quate capital to advance their product lines, have followed the same path. In
1973, the North American Rockwell conglomerate purchased the Collins Avi-
onics Company, and became Rockwell International. Collins retained its iden-
tity as the Collins Avionics Division of Rockwell International. The acquisition
at that time supplied Collins with the capital needed to enter the highly competi-
tive airframe systems/seller furnished equipment (SFE) market.
Allied Chemical purchased Bendix in 1982 and in 1984, Allied-Bendix pur-
chased the King Radio Company. AlliedSignal was formed as a result of a
merger with Signal Corporation in 1985.12 In 1992 Bendix formed a team with
Dassault of France, in which Dassault offered a high gain SATCOM antenna
subsystem and Bendix, not a SATCOM supplier, primarily offered domestic
U.S. marketing contacts. The Bendix name officially disappeared in 1993.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, Collins, with 70 percent market
share, struggled with a bleak financial outlook, due to a projected downturn in
new airplane orders. Collins teamed with Ball Aerospace to provide the direc-
tional antenna, a key element in its traffic alert and collision avoidance product
(TCAS). Later, Collins again teamed with Ball Aerospace to provide high-gain
and low-gain antenna subsystems, and a Class A high-power amplifier for its
SATCOM system.
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In the 1970s, Sperry Flight Systems purchased the division of RCA that
manufactured air transport weather radar systems. Honeywell purchased Sperry
Flight Systems in 1986 and, in 1992, Westinghouse, looking for market opportu-
nities and applications for its military avionics products, teamed with Honey-
well to jointly offer a commercial version of the Westinghouse military weather
radar system, modified to perform the predictive windshear detection function.
Alliances and teaming arrangements of this type were intended to save invest-
ment dollars by combining areas of complementary expertise among manufac-
turers. On balance, these arrangements have not worked due primarily to a lack
of control and coordination among the participants. Different program priorities
have produced schedule interruptions and occasional failure to meet airline
schedule requirements. Different levels of funding and commitment have often
led to inconsistent after-sale support.
In the meantime, dominance of the avionics industry by U.S. firms started to
lessen. The success of the Airbus consortium led inevitably to European public
support for avionics system development. A consortium of European avionics
firms, which previously addressed only military needs, organized to produce
supplier-furnished equipment (SFE) for the Airbus line of airplanes. These
firms included Thompson CSF, Sfena, EAS, and Crouzet. They merged to form
Sextant Avionique and placed 50 percent of their shares with Aerospatiale. Sex-
tant began producing buyer-furnished equipment (BFE) for the avionics mar-
kets in the mid-1980s, and is expected to increase its market share in the late
1990s. In 1993, Northwest Airlines announced a joint development program
with Sextant to develop an integrated optical system for low visibility
approaches. If such a program achieved even moderate success, the entire
Northwest fleet would be outfitted with these advanced European avionics.
AN OUTLOOK OF THE AVIONICS INDUSTRY
Reductions in military R&D budgets, combined with cost-cutting strategies
of airlines will likely impact the technological development and innovations in
avionics. Products may be somewhat more mundane, and new technologies will
be implemented at a much slower pace. New operating systems such as the
Future Air Navigation System (FANS), Communication-Navigation-
Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM), Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), and Free Flight are not being implemented
smoothly, activation estimates varying from one period to the next. Future
developments in avionics technology include low-visibility approaches to re-
place existing instrument landing system; satellite-based area navigation (point-
to-point) systems to replace existing enroute navigation facilities; and reducing
oceanic lane dimensions to increase the availability of economical routings in
oceanic regions, particularly the North Atlantic.13 The U.S. Global Positioning
System (GPS) and the Russian GLONASS satellite constellations offer broad
foundations for these systems. The Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
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provide the geometry for four-dimensional navigation: position (latitude and
longitude), altitude, and speed. GNSS provides extremely accurate area naviga-
tion over land or water. Airborne receivers are becoming available at prices that
are kept low by aggressive competition, while multi-mode receivers (MMRs)
are being installed to accommodate both gradual implementation of GPS
domestically, and European-specific landing systems (MLS) simultaneously.
GNSS also is potentially accurate enough for uses in instrument
approaches.14 Potential accuracy refers to codes that once were available only to
the military and now are being made available for commercial use, as well as
differential geometry applications GNSS, combined with autoland and an
enhanced or synthetic vision system (e.g., multi-modal radar), could be the all-
weather landing system of the future. It also would reduce or eliminate the need
for extremely expensive capital investments in airport infrastructure, obviating
the need to build Category III runways and higher quality ground-based radio
beacon systems. Finally, GNSS accuracy can allow linking back satellite coor-
dinates via SATCOM data to coastal air traffic control facilities, where the infor-
mation can be displayed on pseudo-radar (a display system based on vector
coordinates derived from GPS position). This will result in reducing oceanic
lane dimensions from the current 60 nautical miles to five miles horizontally and
from 2,000 feet to 1,000 feet vertically. These requirements are manifest in new
standards for Required Navigation Performance (RNP) and Reduced Vertical
Separation Minima (RVSM).
In the area of communications, it is expected that much routine voice traffic
between air traffic control and air transport flight crews will be replaced by digi-
tal data link messages generated by ground-side and on-board airborne comput-
ers. Canned messages will be uplinked to the airplane or downlinked from the
airplane in the data link service, processed on the receiving side and displayed to
the recipient. It is as yet undecided whether this technology will be in the L-band
or conventional VHF range.
All new technologies will have to be introduced in a cost-effective manner.
No matter how critical or desirable a new capability may appear, it will not be
accepted by airlines unless the price of acquiring it is justified by cost-savings. It
is estimated that the investment needed to continue and complete the technology
applications described above could exceed $1 billion. Avionics manufacturers
do not have the capital available, and do not expect to in the near future.
One conjecture foresees the takeover of avionics firms by airframe manufac-
turers, which may draw little objection from the antitrust community. Should it
occur, it would constitute one of the most significant changes ever to take place
in the U.S. commercial aviation industry. Freedom of choice of avionics, a long
established and coveted principle among airlines, will likely disappear. More
highly integrated systems may be produced by airframe manufacturers at a lower
cost than todays more discrete units. ARINC standards probably will cease to
exist under such an arrangement, as an airframe manufacturer will design avion-
ics with less concern for interchangeability with a competitors airplane.
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The first sign that the industry is moving in this direction already has
appeared in the form of the Boeing 777s AIMS Cabinet architecture developed
by Boeing. Taking advantage of continued component-level miniaturization
and circuit-level integration, the B777 avionics systems architecture is built
around an avionics integrated management system: AIMS Cabinet. It contains a
number of avionics functions in the form of plug-in modules; previously these
were built as individual boxes. These functions include the flight management
system (FMS), display generation, airline communications addressing and
reporting system (ACARSa VHF data link system), the central maintenance
computer (CMC), the thrust management computer (TMC), and the data acqui-
sition functions performed by the digital flight data acquisition unit (DFDAU).
Airlines who purchase the B777 are acquiring plug-in modules instead of dis-
crete units as spares for these systems.
This architecture signals a dramatic change in the way avionics maintenance
will be performed at the line and depot levels. It raises new questions regarding
how such units are to be certified, updated and configuration-controlled. As avi-
onics functions become less discrete and are represented more by generic mod-
ules plugged into a cabinet designed as SFE hardware, avionics will become
commodity-like in the marketplace. As barriers to entry are lowered, traditional
avionics suppliers may have to continue downsizing, or, as suggested earlier,
may become targets for acquisition by the airframe manufacturers. This may
signal the end of an industry dominated by the United States throughout the his-
tory of aviation.
CONCLUSIONS
The aviation industry is slowly but surely changing its character. As airlines
restructure, what they ask of, and how they relate to their suppliers (including
avionics manufacturers) will greatly change as well. In particular, the avionics
industry is facing many challenges as a result of airlines reluctance to invest in
new technologies and the possibility that airframe manufacturers will take over
this industry. To survive and thrive, avionics manufacturers will need (1) a com-
prehensive understanding of their customers (especially their economics and
underlying needs), (2) an objective capability assessment-measured against the
emerging set of customer requirements, and (3) a thorough appraisal of partner-
ships and alliances to assess their impacts on cost and non-economic factors like
quality and flexibility. A careful assessment of risk and overall strategic ramifi-
cations is also essential.15
In order to survive in the 1990s and beyond, avionics firms will have to
develop innovative marketing strategies. They will need a complete understand-
ing of how each airline customer operates (e.g., customers priorities, desires and
requirements.) AlliedSignal, for example, has developed a new custom display
development system which supports fast and cost-effective design of primary
(EFIS) flight displays customized to customer requirements.16 Avionics firms
will need to provide complete service packages to airlines, including spares leas-
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ing and contract maintenance. They also can exploit the new market opportuni-
ties for technically upgraded retrofit equipment to extend the lives of older
airplanes for several more years. An example is Northwest Airlines program to
modernize its DC-9 fleet by retrofitting Stage III noise kits, FAA-required aging
aircraft modifications, new interiors, and updated avionics systems.
Avionics manufacturers also can seek and develop meaningful strategic alli-
ances with other U.S. and foreign firms. Manufacturers must base strategic alli-
ances on what they bring to the market, not solely on what they bring to each
participating firm. These emerging trends will change the business environment
of the avionics industry from a strongly autonomous operation to one of com-
plex interdependence.
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
AVIONICS Aviation electronics
ARINC Aeronautical Radio, Inc.
CRT Cathode Ray Tube
LCD Liquid Crystal Display
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
DME Distance Measuring Equipment
FMS Flight Management System
NM Nautical Miles
EICAS Engine Indication and Crew Alerting System
EEC Electronic Engine Control
FADEC Fuel Authority Digital Engine Control
SFC Specific Fuel Consumption
R&D Research and Development
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
SATCOM Satellite Communications
MTBF Mean Time Between Failure
SFE Seller Furnished Equipment
TCAS Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
ACARS ARINC Communications Addressing and Reporting System
DFDAMU Digital Flight Data Acquisition and Management Unit
BFE Buyer Furnished Equipment
GPS Global Positioning System (U.S.)
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System (Russian)
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System (Generic)
AIMS Avionics Integrated Management System
CMC Central Maintenance Computer
TMC Thrust Management Computer
DFDAU Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit
EFIS Electronic Flight Instrument System
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Book Review
Kern, T. (1997). Redefining Airmanship. New York: McGraw-Hill. 463 pages.
ISBN 0-07-034284-9. U.S.$29.95, hardcover.
Reviewed by Frederick Hansen, University of Nebraska at Omaha
Redefining Airmanship by Tony Kern is written by an aviator for aviators
whether they have just soloed for the first time or they are senior captains flying
for a major airline. Dont be mistaken. It is not just another how-to-fly book. It is
a serious work supported by numerous case studies. The authors stated purpose
is to challenge all pilots to undertake a lifetime of learning by constantly striving
for personal and professional improvement in their airmanship skills. As with
other authors who have attempted to write about airmanship, Dr. Kern relies on
both personal experience and the experiences of others. Much of this informa-
tion is a result of lessons learned from accident reports and from the stories of
those lucky enough to walk away from an accident or close call. The strength of
this book lies in the advice and recommendations for self improvement that are
equally pertinent to the novice private pilot, the military fighter pilot, and the
seasoned commercial pilot.
Why is it necessary to write such a book about airmanship? After all, no pilot
deliberately climbs into an airplane with the express intent of crashing. The
answer lies in the wealth of case studies provided in this book. Failures in good
airmanship all too often lead to tragedy and unnecessary deaths for both the pilot
in command and innocent victims. Those who fly for a living and especially
those who teach new pilots have a moral obligation to not talk the talk about
good airmanship but to walk the walk and provide the standards for others to
emulate. Airmanship requires that every pilot personally accept the responsibil-
ity and determination to strive for perfection on every flight. The skills and pro-
fessionalism we demonstrate during check rides should be our minimum
standards and not the occasion for super effort.
Dr. Kern certainly has the qualifications to discuss this subject. He is an assis-
tant professor of history at the U.S. Air Force Academy and an instructor pilot.
He holds a doctorate in higher education and masters degrees in public admini-
stration and military history. Previous assignments included service as aircrew
commander, instructor pilot, and flight examiner for the B-1 bomber; human
factors training; and Chief of Cockpit Resource Management Plans and Pro-
grams.
Redefining Airmanship is divided into five main sections. The first section
introduces the concept of airmanship. Most pilots I have known would have a
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difficult time trying to define good airmanship. Common answers would
include words such as common sense, good judgement, situational awareness,
and being prepared. Whatever the definition, almost every pilot can readily
identify those who demonstrate good airmanship and those who dont.
In the next three sections, the author lays out his airmanship model. This
model uses an analogy of a building with a foundation, support pillars and dual
capstones. Section two begins with a description of the model and expands into
the specific foundation stones of discipline, skill, and proficiency. Section
three moves onto the pillars. These pillars are knowledge of self, the aircraft, the
team, the environment, and risk. Section four discusses the two capstones of air-
manship. These capstones are situational awareness and judgement.
The final section of the book deals with associated topics affecting airman-
ship. Among these topics are the role of human error in learning, techniques for
teaching and evaluating, and common inhibitors to good airmanship. The book
concludes with ten common principles of airmanship and a six-month planning
calendar involving three hours-per-week of study and a regular schedule of fly-
ing. This plan relies predominately on self-instruction, self-assessment, and
total honesty.
Each chapter of this book is designed to build on the last in the same manner
that a building is erected by starting with a sound foundation and adding addi-
tional parts of the structure until reaching the capstone. Each chapter is organ-
ized around several case studies that allow the reader to reflect on the
information as it pertains to their own aviation skills. Although the author is
speaking from years of experience in how the Air Force operates, he presents
adequate examples from general aviation and commercial aviation as well. In
those instances when he is describing military procedures or military accidents,
he has attempted to decipher the military language in terms that civilian pilots
will understand.
The three bedrock principles that form the foundation for good airmanship
are discipline, skill, and proficiency. Kern defines flight discipline as the ability
and willpower to safely employ an aircraft within operational, regulatory, organ-
izational, and common sense guidelinesunless emergency or combat mission
demands dictate otherwise (p. 29). Violations of good flight discipline when
uncorrected tend to reinforce poor decisions leading to additional violations. For
pilots who serve as role models for others, poor discipline sends a very clear sig-
nal that rules only apply to the tame and inexperienced. A strong argument is
made that this type of behavior, sometimes known as the rogue aviator, can only
occur when that behavior is repeatedly ignored or condoned by others.
Chapter 3 presents the next two bedrock principles for a two edged sword
skill and proficiency. An introduction to this chapter, written by Chuck Yeager,
makes three comments: complacency kills, knowledge of your aircraft is criti-
cal, and the best pilots constantly strive for personal improvement. This chapter
was the most interesting to me because it reinforced everything I believe as a
pilot myself. This is also the first book I have read that discusses the importance
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of armchair flyinga technique I not only practiced but taught to my flight stu-
dents. Skill is not something that is taught once and retained forever. Skill is
developed over time and will deteriorate over time unless practiced.
The author presents four levels of skill for pilots. Level one is safety, for
example when a new pilot first solos they have demonstrated enough skill to
takeoff and land under routine conditions. The second level is effectiveness in
which the pilot has demonstrated they have all the skills necessary to perform
the duties of flying. For private pilots this may mean the ability to fly cross-
country, obtain flight clearances, check weather conditions, and land in a cross-
wind. The third skill level is efficiency in which the pilot learns how to optimize
the flight environment such as choosing an altitude based on a comparison of
winds versus fuel consumption. The fourth skill level is reached by very few
aviators. It has the goal of precision and continuous improvement. If a 100 foot
altitude deviation is the accepted standard, these pilots will strive for a 50 foot
deviation and then 25 feet.
The other side of the skill sword is proficiency. Pilots with fewer that 10
hours per month are at greater risk than those with more hours as are those with
too many hours who may suffer from fatigue. Proficiency is also more than just
hours in the logbook. Those hours must be used to hone specific skills. The
author points out that studies have shown that important safety-of-flight items
such as landings, unusual attitude recoveries, and crosswind takeoffs deterio-
rate quickly (p. 62). These foundations are critical to the individual pilot since
the other elements of the airmanship model cannot compensate for poor skill,
proficiency, or discipline.
Once the foundation has been established, the pilot is ready to progress on to
the pillars of knowledgeself, aircraft, team, environment, and risk. Each pillar
is covered in a separate chapter in the book. It goes without saying that it is
extremely important for pilots to be physically and mentally fit before attempt-
ing to fly. The book delves into the numerous physical problems of concern to
pilots. Some may only be a problem at altitude or under stress while others
impact the basic ability of pilots to function effectively under any circum-
stances. Alcohol, drugs, medications, and any other inhibitors to the health of
the pilot cannot be tolerated. The FAA provides numerous guidelines on what
constitutes a physically capable pilot but only a mature pilot can make the judge-
ment about whether to attempt a flight.
Knowing the aircraft seems like another obvious pillar to good airmanship
but the author points out that it means more than just knowing emergency proce-
dures, cross wind limitations, stall speeds, and switch locations. It also includes
awareness of cockpit design problems, cautions and warnings, detailed knowl-
edge of aircraft systems, and the maintenance history of the aircraft. The pilot
needs to know this before climbing into the aircraft. Although the author pres-
ents good case studies, I am personally familiar with a case in which a pilot took
off in a Navy Corsair II with his wings folded. How this happened is a separate
discussion but the pilot realized his mistake after becoming airborne. No proce-
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dures were published for this emergency even though there had been at least one
fatal accident due to this problem prior to this incident. The pilot knew both the
flight implications of folded wings in flight and that the hydraulic system should
permit lowering and locking the outer wings. He was able to save the aircraft and
his own life by thoroughly understanding the aircraft.
In the chapter six, the author introduces much of the latest knowledge about
teamwork and crew resource management. Emphasis is placed on leadership,
communication, and importantly on followership. Kern uses Kellys model of
follower behavior to discuss how this impacts on teamwork. The five types of
followers are sheep, yes people, alienated followers, effective followers, and
survivors (Kelly, 1988). Of this group, only the effective followers demonstrate
the combination of independent critical thinking and active participation that
contribute to good teamwork.
The next two chapters covers the importance of knowing the environment
and risk taking. The environment includes the physical, regulatory, and organ-
izational elements while risk taking involves the decision making process
involved in deciding both what constitutes a risk and when to accept the risk.
Get-home-itis is the classic example of accepting unnecessary risk. These two
chapters seemed more firmly founded in the military environment that other
chapters and also more difficult to deal with from the perspective of personal
improvement. Risk taking in particular is a very insidious problem for pilots
because it leaves little room for unexpected changes. Changes in forecast
weather, enroute winds, fuel consumption, or emergencies can turn a previously
acceptable risk into a very bad risk. Risk taking is always a gamble that the mis-
sion requires the risk and that the risk was properly evaluated and prepared for.
The capstones to Kerns model of airmanship are situational awareness and
judgement. The second most important chapter I found in this book was on situa-
tional awareness (SA). Even the most professional pilot will be challenged to
maintain situational awareness. If situational awareness is lost at the wrong
moment, it can have disastrous results. The author presents a thorough discus-
sion of SA including levels of SA, how to recognize it, how to recover from lost
situational awareness, and keys to prevent losing SA. The only error I found in
this chapter was the five keys to improving SA that turned out to present six
keys.
In chapter 10, the author begins with a quote from Charles Gow. Judgement
is not the knowledge of fundamental laws; it is knowing how to apply a knowl-
edge of them (p. 253). Judgement errors dominate aircraft accident reports
under its other common namepilot error. Judgement is a matter of choosing
alternatives which becomes increasingly difficult when the decision maker has
inaccurate or incomplete information.
The book ends with chapters on obstacles to good airmanship, the key role of
instructing and evaluating airmanship, and understanding pilot error. These
chapters bring together the previous discussions in an attempt to recap the
important issues and introduce the last chapter of the book about developing a
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personal program of improvement. The six month program the author offers is
well thought out and worth reading. Unfortunately, I doubt that anyone will
complete the program as outlined. Some pilots already have a personal commit-
ment to being the best pilot possible and work very hard to do those things out-
lined in the book. As mentioned in the book, the study plan requires time,
resources, self-assessment, self-instruction, and honesty. None of these are easy
for private, recreational pilots in particular. In fact, my personal experience
would indicate that the only group who might be able to tackle this program
would be military pilots. Even with this limitation, there are components of this
program that would benefit most pilots.
Redefining Airmanship provides a holistic approach to the subject. It is very
well written and uses case studies from general aviation, the military, and com-
mercial world to emphasize each topic. I would suggest that this book be
required reading for all flight instructors and evaluators. I also can think of no
aviator, regardless of experience, who would not greatly benefit by reading the
book. It is not the final definition of airmanship but a book designed to point out
to every pilot the areas where improvement can be made.
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